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NOTES ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD
AND TENANT1
By ALLAN W. RHYNHART*
I. WHEN RELATION EXISTS
The relation exists when the person in possession of
lands occupies them in subordination of the title of another
and with his express or implied assent.2 It always arises
by contract' express or implied, such as a lease which sets
out the terms of the letting; or by operation of law as the
result of the acts of the parties, as when one co-tenant
moves and the remaining co-tenant takes another in posses-
sion, in which case, if the landlord accepts rent from those
in possession, there is sufficient evidence of surrender and
the acceptance of the new occupant as tenant.4 A primary
test is whether there is an obligation to pay rent. While a
valid demise may exist even though no rent is paid," for
practical purposes it may be assumed that unless rent is
paid or reserved, there is no tenancy. The rent must issue
for the use or occupancy of land or a structure or a part
of a structure on the land. The furnishing of services, such
as housework, of an equivalent value to rent may create a
tenancy when the occupant has exclusive possession and
control of the quarters occupied.6 A provision in the lease
of a farm for payment to the owner of a percentage of the
net profits does not affect the landlord-tenant status, nor
create a partnership.7
ICitations to Alexander's British Statutes are to the Second Edition,
published by Coe in 1912, which is hereinafter cited "ArmxAND:M".
Certain texts are frequently cited throughout this Article by the names
of the authors only. The full title of each such text, and the edition thereof,
together with the method of citation is as follows:
McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910), hereinafter cited "McAnAM".
POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th ed,., 1925), hereinafter cited 'PoE".
TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910), hereinafter cited "TIFFANY".
VENAILE, REAr. PROPERTY (undated compilation), hereinafter cited
"VENABLE".
* Chief Judge, Peoples' Court of Baltimore City; L.B., University of
Maryland, 1920.
21 MCADAM, n. 1, 127.
'Ibid, § 23.
"Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 25, 1009.
6 Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909).
'6 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 73A, § 7(4); Tomlinson v. Dille, 147 Md. 161,
127 A. 746 (1925).
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II. WHEN RELATION DOES NOT ExIST
Husband and wife. Husband and wife, holding as ten-
ants by the entireties, cannot lease the property so held to
the wife or the husband' since that in effect is a rental from
a landlord to himself as a tenant.
Sub-tenants. There is no privity of estate or contract
between the landlord and a sub-lessee.9 An unrecorded
permissible assignment by the tenant in a recorded lease
for a term in excess of seven years merely constitutes the
assignee a sub-lessee.'" An occupant of premises who does
not hold an assignment from the lessee and who therefore
has assumed none of the obligations of a tenant, is not
entitled to assert against the landlord provisions in the
lease granting options to the tenant."
Receivers. A court appointed receiver who takes posses-
sion of leased premises does not thereby become the as-
signee of the lease and is not liable as tenant for use and
occupation. 2 However, such receiver has the right to
adopt the lease, in which event he becomes liable on its
covenants; and he has a reasonable time within which to
make such determination. 8
Lodgers and boarders. There are occupancies where
money is paid which do not amount to a landlord-tenant
relation. A lodger is not a tenant when (although having
exclusive use of the room) the landlord or his servant looks
after the house and furniture; likewise a boarder who
receives meals as well as lodging is not a tenant even
though the living quarters occupied by him are for his
exclusive use,'" nor is a servant of the owner.'5 A lodger
is a person whose occupancy is of a part of a house and
subordinate to and in some degree under the control of the
owner. 6 Distinguishing between lodger and tenant, the
rule seems to be that a tenant has an exclusive possession
whereas the lodger has merely the use without actual or
exclusive possession.'" The occupant of a room in an office
building is a tenant, even though the owner provides ser-
8Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163, 161 A. 510 (1932).
9 VENABLE, n. 1, 59.10 Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
n Jay Dee Shoes v. Goldsmith, The Daily Record, January 11, 1950 (Cir.
Ct. of Baltimore City).1 Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10 A. 309 (1887).
23 Dietrich v. O'Brien, 122 Md. 482, 89 A. 717 (1914).
'1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 34.
2 1 McADAm, n. 1, 131.
11 43 C.J.S. 1137, Innkeepers.
17 Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909), 43 C.J.S. 1138-1139,
Innkeepers. For a discussion of the distinction between tenant and lodger,
see Tenant, Lodger and Guest, 64 Yale L. J. 391 (1955).
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vices, such as cleaning and maintenance. The fact that the
accommodations are in a hotel does not necessarily mean
that the occupant is a lodger.
Remedies against lodgers and boarders. As to these,
the owner is not entitled to summary ejectment for non-
payment of rent, as the relationship is not that of landlord
and tenant. Practically speaking it would appear that if
the owner orders the boarder or lodger out of the premises
and the latter refuses to go, the owner may call on public
authority and have the police eject the erstwhile boarder
as a trespasser. The owner has rights under the Code:
Article 71, Section 5:18
"Any person taking boarders or lodgers into his
house and renting to them a room or furnishing them
with board or both shall have a lien upon any personal
effects, goods or furniture brought upon the premises in
pursuance of such contracting for room or board, .... 9"
It has been made a misdemeanor to fail to pay for lodging,
food or credit at any hotel, boarding house, inn, hospital, or
sanitarium."9 Hotels, rooming houses and lodging houses
are defined as buildings containing five or more beds which
are offered to the public for rental or hire.2"
Illustrative rules to determine existence of tenancy. To
determine whether a tenancy exists: (1) The occupancy
must be for a fixed period. (2) It must be accepted by the
parties that the occupant proposes to use the premises with
some degree of permanence. (3) The right of occupancy
must be exclusive with no right in others to use them
except on the occupant's permission. (4) The occupant's
rights are restricted to occupancy. Although services relat-
ing to occupancy, such as furnishing of cleaning services,
linens, etc., may not change his status away from that of
tenant, if he is entitled to other services such as food,
nursing, etc., then ordinarily he is not a tenant.
III. CATEGORIES OF LETTINGS
All lettings fall into one of two categories: (1) leases
for years, which are for a fixed term and (2) leases at will,
which include both written and oral leases which run from
year to year, and parole lettings from week to week, or
month to month, as well as lettings at sufferance.
186 MD. CODE (1957).
"MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, §§ 161-162.
Baltimore City Code (1950), Art. 12, § 63.
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A. Leases for Years and From Year to Year.
The titles may be misleading. A lease for years simply
means a lease for a fixed term, which may be for any par-
ticular period. A lease from year to year, or periodic
tenancy, is a lease or letting which automatically renews
itself; leases from week to week, month to month, or year
to year, are included in this category. The fundamental
difference between a tenancy for years and from year to
year is that the first is for a definite period of time and
terminates by lapse of that time, without notice, although
for the exercise of the right to the summary remedy for
the recovery of possession of the land a statutory notice
must be given,21 and the second is for the first period of
time with an indefinite succession of periodic renewals
unless determined by a notice to quit to the other by either
the landlord or the tenant, since the right of a notice to
quit is reciprocal so that either landlord or tenant has the
right to terminate a letting from year to year.2
Statute of frauds. Under 29 Charles 2, Ch. 3, §§1, 2,
and 4,23 an oral lease may be for a period not exceeding
three years.24 Leases for more than three years must be in
writing. Leases for more than seven years must be signed,
sealed, witnessed, acknowledged and recorded. 5
Construction of written lease. The principle that a lease
must be construed most strongly against a lessor and in
favor of a lessee is resorted to only when the words of the
instrument are doubtful in their meaning or susceptible
to more than one construction.26
Even though a document may not constitute a valid
lease, as for example, a lease for more than seven years
which has not been acknowledged, yet in a proper case it
can be treated as an agreement to lease and may be specific-
ally enforced.27 A lease from year to year containing a
provision for automatic renewal, but which is terminable
by either party at the end of the original or a succeeding
term, does not create an estate for more than seven years.2"
215 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 53, §§ 1-8.
1 Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113, 98 A.L.R. 212 (1935).
2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 509.
24 Union Banking Co. v. Gittings, 45 Md. 181 (1876).
12 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § 1.
Standard Garments Co. v. Hoffman, 199 Md. 42, 85 A. 2d 456, 30 A.L.R.
2d 485 (1952).
17Thompson v. Thomas & Thompson Co., 132 Md. 483, 104 A. 49 (1918).
Saul v. McIntyre, 190 Md. 31, 57 A. 2d 272 (1948). See infra, p. 8, Void
Lease.
2 Canary v. Wagner, 191 Md. 413, 62 A. 2d 257 (1948) ; 2 MD. COD (1957),
Art. 21, § 1.
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B. Leases for Years or for a Fixed Term.
A lease for years is one for a fixed term and not neces-
sarily one for a certain number of years.29 At common law
there is no restriction upon the length of the term that
may be created.3" There is some statutory limitation on
this common law rule. A lease for more than seven years
must be executed, acknowledged and recorded; provisions
for renewal, optional with either landlord or tenant, do not
necessarily make a lease for more than seven years; and
even a lease for more than seven years which has not been
executed and recorded according to the statute, is binding
between the original parties to such lease." A lease for
more than fifteen years sets up in the tenant a right of
redemption,"2 unless the premises are leased exclusively
for business purposes and the term, including all renewals
provided for in the lease does not exceed ninety-nine
years.8 In the instance of a ground rent, when it is shown
that the ground rent has been neither demanded nor paid
for more than twenty consecutive years, the effect is to
bar not only the rent already due but also the reversionary
interest of the owner of the fee. It has been held that the
mailing of a bill for ground rent by the owner of the fee
within the twenty year period creates a presumption of
demand, thus preserving his title. 4 If the lease contains
no provision for automatic renewal, then the relationship
of landlord and tenant ceases to exist on the termination
of the lease. If the tenant fails to move on the terminal
date, then the landlord has the election (1) to treat the
tenant as a trespasser in the sense that he is a tenant hold-
ing over; or (2) to treat the lessee as a tenant from year
to year.85
C. Leases from Year to Year or Periodic Leases.
Agreement. Such a letting may be created by express
agreement of the parties, in which the terms and conditions
of the letting, as well as the mode of termination are
explicitly set forth.
Implication of law. Such a letting is created when the
occupant goes into possession as tenant, without any under-
standing or agreement as to the term of the letting.
2D I TIFFANY, n. 1, 45.
a' Op. cit. ibid, 55.
812 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § L
822 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §§ 103-104.
Ibid, § 108.
"Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 99 A. 2d 743 (1953).
a Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876) ; Fetting Etc. Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50,
152 A. 434, 71 A.L.R. 1443 (1930).
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"[W] here there is no evidence as to the terms of the
letting, . .. the monthly payment of rent would show a
letting at a monthly rent, thereby creating a tenancy from
month to month.... , Such a lease renews itself from
term to term, but is terminable by the giving of a notice
to quit by the landlord or a notice of termination by the
tenant. When payments of rent are made weekly this
creates a presumption of a tenancy from week to week. 7
Void lease. When a tenant enters upon land under a
void or defective lease, the periodical payment of a yearly
rent creates a tenancy from year to year." Prior to June 1,
1951, a lease for more than seven years which had not
been executed and recorded in accordance with Article 21,
Section 1,19 was invalid; if the tenant entered into posses-
sion and rent was accepted then a tenancy from month to
month or from year to year was created 0 and all of the
provisions of the lease applied excepting those as to its
duration.41 However, Chapter 565 of the Acts of 195142
modified this rule to provide that an unrecorded lease for
more than seven years shall be valid and binding between
the original parties to such lease.
A lease invalid at law may be enforced in equity as a
contract to lease although otherwise the tenancy would be
one from year to year by implication of law.
43
Tenant holding over. When a tenant for years holds
over after the expiration of his term, he becomes a tenant
from year to year by implication of law as when a tenant
after termination remains in possession with the landlord's
consent and without further contract,44 the election is in
the landlord and not in the tenant. Any act of the landlord
which recognizes an existing tenancy after the terminal
date, such as acceptance of the rent, will be a binding
election upon him of the existence of a lease from year to
year.45 A landlord is not required to make a prompt elec-
tion. When a tenant sends a check for one month's rent,
proposing that it be accepted as an amendment of the ten-
' 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 133.
McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 7, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
8 Falck v. Barlow, 110 Md. 159, 72 A. 678 (1909) ; Darling Shops v. Balto.
Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948), noted 9 Md. L.
Rev. 362 (1948).
'm2 MD. CODE (1957).
10 Cook v. Boehl, 188 Md. 581, 53 A. 2d 555 (1947) ; Schultz v. Kaplan, 189
Md. 402, 56 A. 2d 17 (1947).
'
1Hyatt v. Romero, 190 Md. 500, 58 A. 2d 899 (1948).
"Now MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § 1.
"Saul v. McIntyre, 190 Md. 31, 57 A. 2d 272 (1948).
" Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113, 98 A.L.R. 212 (1935).
'1 Vrooman v. McKaig, 4 Md. 450 (1853).
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ancy to a month-to-month one, acceptance and use of the
check by landlord does not alter or reduce a landlord's
rights because the amount of the check is what the land-
lord is entitled to if he elects to treat the tenant as one
holding over and, consequently, liable as tenant for an-
other year.4" Once made such an election creates a tenancy
upon the same terms and conditions as the original lease 7
except that the subsequent letting is from year to year.48
If the landlord demands and receives an increased rent
from the tenant, the new lease from year to year will be
on the same terms as the former lease but at the higher
rent.49 Provisions for premature termination of a tenancy
are as applicable in a lease from year to year thus created
as they were to the original lease for years.5 0 While a lease
from year to year thus created contains all of the cove-
nants in the original lease applicable to the new situation,5
so that an option in a tenant to purchase contained in the
lease for years carries over into the subsequent tenancy,52
it is possible to so word an option contained in a lease for
years that it will not carry over into the subsequent lease.5 3
Similarly, in a lease from year to year an option to pur-
chase in the lessee may be so expressed as to be effective
only during the original term and not during a succeed-
ing term.54 However, if the landlord and tenant are actu-
ally negotiating for a new lease at the expiration of the
old lease, and if the tenant remains in possession pending
such negotiations, with either express or tacit consent of
the landlord, the landlord is estopped from treating the
tenant as holding over for another term. To establish this
situation it is necessary that: (1) the landlord consent to
the tenant remaining in the premises for a temporary
period and; (2) that the parties were actually engaged in
negotiating as to a renewal of the lease when the previous
term ended. Unilateral acts or statements of the tenant
do not constitute "negotiations"; there must be positive
acts or statements on the part of the landlord.5
"Donnelly Adver. Corp. v. Flaccomlo, 216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
'7 Hobbs v. Batory, 86 Md. 68, 37 A. 713 (1897).
Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876) ; Gostin v. Needle, 185 Md. 634, 45
A. 2d 772, 163 A.L.R. 1013 (1946).
"1 Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md. 212, 100 A. 507 (1917).
50 Gostin v. Needle, supra, n. 48.
51 Schaeffer v. Bilger, 186 Md. 1, 45 A. 2d 775, 163 A.L.R. 706 (1946).
Bagley v. Clark, 190 Md. 223, 57 A. 2d 739 (1948).
Gressitt v. Anderson, 187 Md. 586, 51 A. 2d 159 (1947).
"Canary v. Wagner, 191 Md. 413, 62 A. 2d 257 (1948).
5Donnelly Adver. Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
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D. Tenants at Will And By Sufferance.
In this section will be found statements in conflict with
other portions of this manual. The reason is that the drafts-
men of our statutes and ordinances have not always em-
ployed precision in the use of technical words and it is not
unknown for the Courts to fall into the same error. The
definitions of the law writers are here included to empha-
size the principle that in solving a problem in the vexing
area of landlord and tenant, it is not always possible to
rely on the literal wording of a statute or a decision.
A tenant at will always is in occupation as of right.
A tenant by sufferance is one who enters by lawful lease
and holds possession wrongfully.56 A tenant at will holds
rightfully; a tenant at sufferance holds wrongfully.57 A
tenancy at will exists as a result of permissive possession
without any understanding as to the duration of the posses-
sion; as for example, one who goes into possession under
a void conveyance.58 "As a general rule, a person who
enters on land by permission of the owner for an indefinite
period and without the reservation of any rent, is a tenant
at will . ,, "A permissive possession constituting a
tenancy at will because of payment of a periodic rent may
be changed into a tenancy from year to year or other
periodic tenancy."6 If a tenant at will transfers his in-
terest in the land, and puts the transferee in possession, the
latter is not a tenant at sufferance but a mere disseisor or
trespasser since he did not enter by right. However, a sub-
lessee of a tenant for years holding over after the expira-
tion of the latter's term is a tenant at sufferance. A tenant
at sufferance is "one holding possession,... who was not
a trespasser and not a disseisor, and yet held of nobody".6
IV. Co-Ow-ER LANDLORDS
One co-tenant cannot make a lease which will be bind-
ing upon his co-tenants without their consent, but he can
lease his own interest with or without the consent of the
others, and the lessee will become a tenant in common with
the others.62 One co-lessor can terminate the lease as to his
own interest without the concurrence of the others. 3
'a 1 MOADAM, n. 1, 676.
5' 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 153.
11 Op. cit. ibid, 105-106.
1 16 R.C.L., Landlord & Tenant, 611-612, § 91.
00 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 125.
O1 p. cit. ibid, 149.
Thompson v. Thomas & Thompson Co., 132 Md. 483, 104 A. 49 (1918).
Cook v. Hollyday, 186 Md. 42,45 A. 2d 768 (194).
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When a husband and wife are owners by entireties and
the husband leases the land giving warranties of title, he
cannot bind his wife, as Maryland has not adopted the
principle that under such circumstances the lease made by
the husband is valid against the wife during coverture.
However, after a divorce if the property leased comes into
the individual ownership of the lessor he is estopped, and
the lease will operate upon his estate as if vested at the
time of its execution.6 4
The statute of 4 Anne Ch. 16, Sec. 27,9 authorizes a
co-tenant to bring an action against his co-tenant for re-
ceiving more than his just share or proportion of the rent.
But equity has no jurisdiction for an accounting for rents
or claims for use and occupation by a single owner or one
of several co-owners against a co-owner as tenant.6
V. TERMINATION OF LANDLORD'S ESTATE
IN MID-TERM
If the landlord has an estate for life and makes a lease
for years and dies before the end of the term, then the
estate of the life tenant's lessee terminates with the death
of the life tenant. However, when the estate of the lessor
determines and the remainderman accepts rent from the
tenant the terms of the lease continue. 7
VI. ASSIGNMENTS OF LEASES
At common law restraints upon alienation are frowned
upon. Therefore, in the absence of a prohibition in the
lease the original tenant has the right to assign his interest
or estate without consent of the landlord. Similarly, the
holder of the reversion has the unqualified right to grant
or convey his interest.
By the Statute 32 Hen. VIII c. 34, §§1 and 2,68 the
grantee of a reversion in lands or tenements shall have like
advantages against the lessee as the lessors or grantors
themselves or their heirs or successors might have had.69
By this statute, ". . . all .. .Lessees .. .for a term of
Years . . . shall ... have like ... Advantage and Remedy
against ... every person ... which have ... any Gift or
Grant... of the Reversion of the... Lands... so letten...
for any Condition, Covenant or Agreement . . .expressed
" Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d
1232 (1955).
112 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 664.
Paradise Amusement Co. v. Hollyday, 190 Md. 48, 57 A. 2d 308 (1948).
'7 VENABLE, n. 1, 61.
1 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 335.
VENABLE, D. 1, 57; Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134 (1890).
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in the Indentures of their . . . Leases, . . . as the same
Lessees . . . might ... have had against the said Lessors
and Grantors .. ,70
The construction of this statute over the years has pro-
duced many complexities. What follows is an over-simpli-
fication, and is intended to serve as but a guide in solving
the simpler problems arising as a result of assignment of
either the term or the reversion. In any case, care must
be exercised to see whether the party to be held as tenant
is actually the assignee of the term, and not merely a
sub-tenant.
A. Effect of Conveyance of the Reversion.
The weight of authority at common law was that cove-
nants ran with the land and not with the reversion.7'
Under the statute, without a formal assignment of the
lease, the grantee of the reversion if it be a freehold title,
has all of the rights of the original lessor against the
lessee, or an assignee of the term of the lease, subject to
the principle that only those agreements may be enforced
which (1) run with the land, or (2) which, by the terms
of the lease are binding upon the assignee thereof. The
corollary to this appears to be that when the estate in
reversion is less than a free-hold estate (i.e. less than a
fee or estate for life) that a transfer of the reversion does
not carry with it any rights to enforce the lease, unless
there is an assignment of the lease. Here, it would appear
that under the provisions of 29 Char. 2, Ch. 3, Sec. 3,7 and
Code Article 8, Section 1, 73 that the assignment of the lease
must be in writing. The statement in the text is debatable.74
Chattels real. The prevalence of the ground rent system
in Baltimore City, under which properties are held under
ninety-nine year leases renewable forever indicates the
wisdom, and probably the necessity, of requiring a written
assignment of any sublease in existence at the time of the
conveyance of the leasehold as the estate of the grantor is
one less than freehold.
B. Assignment of Rent.
The assignee of the reversion is entitled to all rent fall-
ing due after the assignment. Rent which falls due before
"Liability to the tenant by the transferee of the reversion, on covenants
of the original landlord is discussed in L.R.A. 1915 C 190.
711 PoE, n. 1, § 332.
722 AT x. 'BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 509.
1 MD. CODE (1957).
"See 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, 33, and Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134
(1890).
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the assignment belongs to the assignor but may be assigned
like any other debt.75 Rent follows the reversion so that
when the lessor dies before the rent comes due, it goes to
the person entitled to the estate;" if the lessor dies after the
rent becomes due, it goes to his personal representative."
The English rule is that an assignee of a rent cannot dis-
train for arrears arising previous to assignment.7 Adher-
ence to this philosophy would deny the purchaser of prop-
erty the right to either distress or summary ejectment for
arrears of rent due at the time of purchase. An apparent
departure from this rule was the decision in Kaufman v.
Collick,79 wherein it was held that when in connection with
a transfer of real estate there is no assignment of accrued
rent in arrears, the vendor is left to his remedy in an
action of debt without any right to distrain or to summary
eviction; but when the accrued rent is assigned to the pur-
chaser at the time of transfer, then the vendee is clothed
with every right of action which the former would have
had if he had continued in ownership of the property,
including the right of distress and summary ejectment."s
Payments to agents or assignees. All payments of
money or other dealings had with a person acting under
a power of attorney or other agency are binding upon the
representatives or principals of such attorney or agent,
even though the principal may have died or assigned his
claim - provided that the person making the payment
had no notice of the death or assignment."' Under the
statute of 4 Anne Ch. 16, Sec. 10,82 a tenant is not liable to
a new landlord for rent if he has paid it to a former land-
lord without notice of the conveyance. However, a tenant
may not defeat a claim of creditors of the landlord by
anticipating payments of rent" or transfer a growing crop
to the damage of a mortgagee of the realty.84 It is a general
principle that the assignee of a claim or chose in action
cannot recover from the original debtor who had paid it to
the assignor after, but without notice of, the assignment. 85
An order by the landlord to the tenant to pay accruing rent
Outtoun v. Dulin, ibid.
Getzandaffer v. Gaylor, 38 Md. 280 (1873).7 Martin v. Martin. 7 Md. 368 (1855).
" Brown v. Metropolitan, 9 Eng. Rul. Cas. 610 (1859).
Kaufman v. C6llick, decided In Baltimore City Court, May 19, 1943.
80 THOMAS, PROCEDURE IN JUSTICE CASES (1917) § 166.
" 1 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 10, § 42.
12 2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 661.
mMartin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).
81 Johnson v. Hines, 61 Md. 122 (1883).
85 Robinson v. Marshall, 11 Md. 251 (1857) ; Lambert v. Morgan, 110 Md.
1, 72 A. 407 (1909).
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to a third person may operate as an assignment, so that
the tenant may be bound to continue to pay such rent,
notwithstanding a later notice from the landlord or a
transferee of the reversion who took title knowing of the
assignment. 6
Prepaid rent and security deposits. Advance rent that
has accrued and been paid (in other words, prepaid rent)
may not be recovered by the lessee's receiver when the
lease has been terminated as a result of lessee's miscon-
duct. In the circumstances of the particular case, recovery
claimed on the ground of unjust enrichment of the land-
lord was denied." In Tatelbaum v. Chertkof, s8 a distinc-
tion was drawn between prepayment of rent and a security
deposit; if a security deposit, it remains the property of
the tenant and passes on to the tenant's trustee in bank-
ruptcy, subject to the landlord's claim; if a prepayment
of rent, then it becomes the property of the landlord and
is not recoverable by the tenant's trustee.
C. Effect of Assignment on Liability
of Original Lessee.
The liability of the original lessee is based upon two
principles: - privity of contract and privity of estate.8 9
Privity of contract. Expressed stipulations in a lease
continue to be binding upon the lessee in spite of an assign-
ment and its recognition by the landlord, an illustrative
stipulation being the covenant to pay rent.9 0 The theory
is that the lessee binds himself to pay the rent, and this
may be an agreement whose enforcement is independent
of retention of an interest under the lease. Thus, provided
the lease is under seal,91 the lessor may proceed against the
original lessee under the covenants contained in the lease.
To be freed from obligation, the original lessor or cove-
nantor must be released by an instrument of equal dignity
to that which created the obligation, i.e., an instrument
under seal.92
Privity of estate. The principle is that the person in
possession of land is liable to the owner on the covenants
or agreements that run with the land, contained in the
original lease, because he who has the benefit of the use
of the land as tenant, is bound to the owner.9 3
Abrams v. Sheehan, 40 Md. 446 (1874).
Lochner v. Martin, The Daily Record, Feb. 4, 1959.
"1212 Md. 475, 129 A. 2d 680 (1957).
81 Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixier & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896).
0 Insley v. Myers, 192 Md. 292, 64 A. 2d 126 (1949).I1I ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 337.
92l PoE, n. 1, § 388.
"Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Go., 84 Md. 437,35 A. 1086 (1896).
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When letting is by sealed instrument. When the lease
is under seal and contains a covenant to pay rent, the
original lessee will remain liable to the lessor under the
covenant, notwithstanding an assignment of the lease to a
third party, and acceptance of rent by the landlord from
the assignee of the term. 4 When a lessee transfers his
interest in the lease, he remains a proper party plaintiff
in a suit against the lessor to enforce the covenants of
the lease. 5
When letting is not by sealed instrument. An assign-
mnent of the term by the original tenant to another, plus
surrender of possession to the assignee of the term, com-
bined with an acceptance by the landlord of the assignee
of the term as tenant, has the effect (1) of exonerating the
original tenant from any obligations to the original land-
lord; and (2) making the assignee of the term responsible
to the landlord.98 Even if the tenant has not legally termi-
nated the tenancy, as by a written notice, the acceptance
of a third person as tenant by the landlord, operates as a
surrender in law and this acceptance consequently exoner-
ates the original tenant from liability."'
No covenant to pay rent. If there is no express cove-
nant to pay rent, the lessee's liability ceases if the lessor
consents to an assignment; and such assent may be inferred
by his accepting rent from the assignee of the term, or by
any other act accepting the assignee of the term as a
tenant. However, to destroy the privity of estate of the
original tenant (and thus his obligation, even though not
express, to pay rent) there must exist the concurrence of
the landlord in the transfer of the term by the original
lessee to the assignee of the term. 8
D. Effect of Assignment on Assignee
of Original Lessee.
Covenants that run with the land. The obligations of
an assignee of the term or lease to the original lessor or
to the grantee of the reversion, rest upon whether or not
the liability asserted is one that runs with the land. Funda-
mentally, these obligations rest upon privity of estate.9
Such covenants are those which relate to or touch and
concern the thing demised, or which extend to the land,
1 PoE, n. 1, § 388.
9Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
1 PoE, n. 1, 388.
Lamar v. McNamee, 10 G. & J. 116 (Md., 1&38).
Oonsumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896).
9Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934) ; Jones
v. Burgess, 176 Md. 270, 4 A. 2d 473 (1939).
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so that the thing required to be done will affect the quality,
value or mode of enjoying the estate.100 For example, as
the covenant to pay rent runs with the land, the lessee is
contractually bound to the lessor to the end of the term'01
and the assignee of the lessee is bound by virtue of his
possession because of privity of estate.102 Acceptance of
an assignment of a lease does not impose upon the assignee
any liability for rent other than that growing out of privity
of estate.0 3 The increasing scope of the role of equity in en-
forcing covenants finds expression in Raney v. Tompkins, °4
in which a covenant by vendor against use of his remaining
land as a filling station was enforced against his grantees
having knowledge of the restriction. 10 5
Rent and taxes. The covenant to pay rent and taxes
runs with the land, so that an assignee of the term is under
an obligation to pay the rent issuing from the land under
the original lease, and this obligation does not depend upon
his actual possession or entry.0 6 Similarly, the holder of
the reversion has the right to enforce the payment of rent
due by the assignee, accruing during assignee's possession
of the land.10 7 However, a suit at law cannot be maintained
against the assignee of a lease who has assigned over, for
ground rent falling due after the assignment to him and
before the assignment by him; the remedy of the lessor
being in equity alone. 0 The rationale of the principle is
that while there may be a debt, it is no longer enforceable
at law because the essence of the right to bring suit is
privity of estate and if there is no existing tenancy, then




°VENABLE, n. 1, 58; 1 TIFFANY, n. 1, § 149, pars. (2), (3), (4) ; Glenn v.
Canby, 24 Md. 127 (1866).
101 Worthington v. Cooke, 56 Md. 51 (1881).
102 Union Trust 0o. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 189 A. 421 (1937).
-10 Reid v. Wiessner & Sons Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 A. 877 (1898).
10 197 Md. 98, 78 A. 2d 183 (1951).
105 The application of the principles to determine the covenants which do
and which do not run with the land is a matter of great difficulty, far
beyond the scope of this article. For beginning points of research into the
principles see 1 PoE, n. 1, §§ 149, 328-335 A and 389-392; 1 ALEx. BRIT. STAT.,
n. 1, 337-355; Spencers Case, 1 Smith Lead. Oas. 137 (1872), 1 TIFFANY,
n. 1, 886. Regarding damages, or relief, for breach of restrictive covenants
running with the land, see Easton v. The Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286,
123 A. 2d 342 (1956).
116 Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934) ; Jones
v. Burgess, 176 Md. 270, 4 A. 2d 473 (1939).
""Hughes v. Young, 5 G. & J. 67 (1832) ; Lester v. Baltimore, 29 Md. 415
(1868) ; Consumers' Ice Co. v. Bixler & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 A. 1086 (1896)
Gibbs v. Dldier, 125 Md. 486, 94 A. 100 (1915) ; 1 POE, n. 1, 149.
""
4Hart v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 169 Md. 446, 182 A. 322 (1936).
101 Gibbs v. Didier, supra, n. 107.
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E. When Assignee's Liability Begins.
Assignment of record. When the conveyance of the
term to the assignee of the leasehold estate is by an assign-
ment necessary to be recorded, any liability to which he is
subject comes into being at the time the assignment is
recorded. There can be no hiatus in a tenancy. Therefore,
in the case of a lease for more than seven years, the
assignor of the term remains liable under the covenants of
the lease until the assignment is recorded. The recording
is the final and complete act which passes title and until
this is accomplished all else is unavailing.110
Possession. If the estate acquired by the assignee is
one not affected by the recording laws, as for example,
a leasehold estate for less than seven years,"' then liability
under the lease for any covenant that runs with the land
does not arise unless and until the assignee goes into posses-
sion, and this liability ceases when he goes out of possession.
Sub-tenants. When there is a covenant by the lessee
that he will not assign his interest, a conveyance by him
(in the absence of waiver by the landlord) creates no
rights as tenant in the purported assignee who holds as a
sub-tenant without liability to the landlord and without
rights assertable against the landlord. Also, even though
there may be no prohibition against assignment (or there
being one, it has been waived) an incomplete or ineffective
assignment creates the status of sub-tenant in the pur-
ported assignee, who again, so far as the landlord is con-
cerned, has neither rights nor liabilities.
When there is a conveyance of land, signed only by the
grantor but accepted by the grantee, a covenant in the
conveyance that the grantee will pay mortgage debts exist-
ing against the land conveyed, has the effect of binding the
grantee as though he had signed the deed." 2 By analogy,
if an assignment of lease contains an agreement on the part
of the assignee of the term to perform the covenants of
the lease, then the assignee will be liable to the same extent
as though he had executed the original lease, even though
the assignee of the term simply accepts the assignment
and takes possession of the demised premises thereunder."'
Based in part upon the foregoing discussion the follow-
ing principles appear to apply in a proceeding brought in
Peoples Court or before a justice: (1) If the lease be under
1"0 Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892).
"2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, § 1.
2 Stokes v. Detrick, 75 Md. 256, 23 A. 846 (1892) ; Rosenthal v. Heft, 155
Md. 410, 142 A. 598 (1928), 159 Md. 302. 150 A. 850 (1930).
I Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934).
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seal, suit may be brought against the original lessee for
unpaid rent whether or not he holds possession. If the
lease is not under seal, then a legally effective assignment
of the term exonerates the original lessee from liability.
(2) An assignee of the term of the lease may rid himself
of future liability under the lease by effectively assigning
the term to someone else. (3) To be legally valid, the
assignment of a parole lease by the tenant or lessor must
be in writing.114 (4) When the original lease was made
by one whose estate determines, such as a life tenant, if
the remainderman accepts rent from the lessee after the
determination of the life estate, then the terms of the
lease continue and the remainderman becomes the land-
lord and the original lessee retains his rights as tenant
under the original lease.'15 (5) The grantee of a reversion
is not entitled to arrears of rent which became due prior
to the transfer of the reversion."' (6) When the original
lessor did not hold title of record at the time of the lease,
an assignee of the original lessor, being the holder of a
chose in action, may bring suit or levy distress only upon
a written assignment of the reversion. (7) When a tenant
under a lease for years transfers his interest in the lease,
he remains a proper party plaintiff in a suit against the
lessor to enforce the covenants of the lease."7 (8) On the
principle that the whole carries with it all of its parts, a
grant of record title by the original lessor, vests in the
grantee the right to enforce any of the covenants contained
in a lease made by the grantor prior to the grant, including
distress for rent; as the conveyance of the reversion carries
with it all of the incidents thereof, including the right to
collect rent from the tenant or occupant and to enforce
the payment of the same."8 (9) Distress. Regardless of
the term or nature of the lease, the assignee-occupant of
the premises should be named as tenant in the landlord's
affidavit; as, after a legally effective assignment by the
original lessee, the only liability that may be asserted
against him is in covenant, arising out of privity of contract.
VII. IMPLIED COVENANTS
Fitness. When a lease contains no express warranty of
fitness of the property for the purpose for which it is
rented there is no implied warranty, and in case the prop-
29 Char. 2, Ch. 3, § 3, 2 ALx. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 521.
""VENABLE, n. 1, 61.
I1 1 ALEX. BRrr. STAT., D. 1, 355.1 7Rubin v. Leosatis, 165 Md. 36, 166 A. 428 (1933).
Outtoun v. Dulin, 72 Md. 536, 20 A. 134 (1890).
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erty falls down because of an inherent defect, the lessor
is not bound to repair, although the lessee will still be
compelled to pay the rent.119
Possession. There is no implied covenant in a lease
that the landlord is required to give the lessee possession.
When at the time of the lease premises are wrongfully
held by a third person, such as a tenant holding over, the
lessee, having the right of entry, has no action against the
lessor, but is left to his remedy against the wrongdoer. 2 '
Where landlord locks the demised premises and refuses
tenant admission for the purpose of removing his furniture
and effects, the landlord is exposed to a suit for conversion
of the tenant's furniture and goods.' 2'
Quiet enjoyment. While there is an implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment, this implication does not extend to
indemnity against damage from the acts of a trespasser.'22
Use. When premises are leased for a specific purpose,
there is an implied covenant on the part of the tenant that
there will be no change of use and if such takes place the
landlord may enjoin him in equity 23 although when the
lease is general in terms as to use of the premises, the
tenant may use them for any lawful purpose not injurious
to the reversion. 24
Wall advertisements. In the absence of a limitation in
the lease itself, a lease of a building includes the external
walls; and a landlord is not entitled to place an advertise-
ment on the outside wall of demised premises, or to lease
such rights to others.121
Waste. A tenant is liable for all waste committed on
the landlord's property, except when caused by an act of
God, public enemy or the lessor himself.'26
VIII. CONSTRUCTION OF LEASES
Description of premises. When a bathroom is used in
common by the tenants of a building, a lease of the portion
of the building containing the bathroom does not give an
"I Clark & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504, 65 A. 326 (1906); See also,
Decedent's Estate, infra, pp. 38-39.
Sigmund v. Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868).
21 Kirby v. Porter, 144 Md. 261, 125 A. 41 (1923).
Baugher v. Wilkins, 16 Md. 35 (1860).
1Gale v. McCullough, 118 Md. 287, 84 A. 469 (1912); North Avenue
Market v. Keys, 164 Md. 185, 164 A. 152 (1933).
124 Gallagher v. Shipley, 24 Md. 418 (1866).
12 Needle v. Scheinberg, 187 Md. 169, 49 A. 2d 334 (1946). For a dis-
cussion of the relative rights of landlord and tenant as to the use of
exterior walls for advertising purposes, see 32 Am. Jur. 197, Landlord and
Tenant; 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 586; L.R.A. 1915B 1057; 22 A.L.R. 800.
'" White v. Wagner, 4 H. & J. 373 (Md., 1815).
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exclusive right to its use by one tenant when his lease
generally describes that portion of the demised premises
which includes the bathroom, but specifies rooms not in-
cluding the bathroom. 127
Effect of new lease. When, before the expiration of a
written lease, a new lease is entered into between the
parties, the new lease does not necessarily revoke the
provisions of the old lease, so that options contained in the
original lease are not necessarily extinguished by the
execution of a new lease, if the continued existence of the
options is not inconsistent with the provisions of the
new lease. 2
8
Modification by conduct. By their conduct after a ten-
ant has gone into possession, the parties may construe the
terms of an ambiguous lease, as well as alter or modify
the contract of letting. 29 Thus, when an original lease did
not oblige a landlord to consent to a tenant's application to
a liquor license board for a license, the fact that landlord
had given such consent in the past made such use a term
of the letting, and the landlord was required to consent to a
renewal application.3 0
IX. OcCUPANCY AS NOTICE
The doctrine is that possession is notice of the rights
of the party in possession to the extent they would have
been ascertained upon inquiry. The extent of this imputed
knowledge is limited to those rights which are asserted
under subsisting relations between the party in possession
and the owner of the land, and thus to some actual out-
standing title or equitable interest, and should not be ex-
tended to those which might arise from a non-existent, dif-
ferent and merely anticipated status with a third party.'
Open possession inconsistent with the record title charges
a prospective purchaser with notice of the occupant's
rights,. 2 but possession by the tenants of a vendor is not
notice to a mortgagee of rights in the vendor conflicting
with the rights of the vendee-mortgagor.' However, the
purchaser of property occupied by a tenant is under notice
sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the terms of the
10 Needy v. Middlekauff, 102 Md. 181, 62 A. 159 (1905).
12 Stedman v. Hill, 195 Md. 568, 74 A. 2d 41 (1950).
I" Saul v. McIntyre, 192 Md. 413, 64 A. 2d 282 (1949) ; Standard, Inc. v.
Alexander, Inc., 214 Md. 214, 133 A. 2d 460 (1957).
Saul v. McIntyre, ibid.
Liggett Co. v. Rose, 152 Md. 146, 136 A. 651 (1927).
s, Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1936) ; Irvington
Fed. Etc. Assn. v. West, 194 Md. 211, 71 A. 2d 1 (1950).
"3Wicklein v Kidd, 149 Md. 412, 131 A. 780 (1926).
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letting, and failing to make it he is visited with the con-
sequences of knowledge.' The existence of a "For Rent"
sign on property is not in itself sufficient to charge a




Double rent. The general law is that when the tenant
has the right to terminate the tenancy by giving notice
to the landlord; and actually gives a sufficient notice of
termination, but does not deliver up possession to the
landlord at the time contained in the notice, then the
tenant shall thenceforth pay to the landlord double the
rent originally contracted for during all the time the ten-
ant continues in possession.8 7 It should be noted that there
is no such right in the landlord at common law when the
landlord terminates the tenancy. 8 ' In Baltimore City, in
the discretion of the judge, damages not exceeding double
rent may be assessed against a tenant holding over after
notice to quit.19 It has also been held that in addition
damages may be awarded the landlord for his expenses in
and about the proceedings. 4 ° The Baltimore City Charter,
Section 743, provides:
"In all cases the tenancy mentioned in this sub-
division of this Article, if the tenant, after notice, fail
to quit at the end of the term, or at a period when he
shall begin as aforesaid to be holding over, such tenant,
his executors or administrators, may, at the election
of the lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns, be held as a tenant and bound to pay double
the rent to which the said tenancy was subject, and
payable and recoverable in all respects and to every
effect as if, by the original agreement or the under-
standing as to such tenancy, said double rent were the
reserved rent of the demised premises, according to the
terms and conditions of payment of such originally
reserved rent."
13 Engler v. Garrett, 100 Md. 387, 59 A. 648 (1905) ; Achtar v. Posner, 189
Md. 559, 56 A. 2d 797 (1948).
"5 Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Treuchel, 164 Md. 636, 166 A. 404 (1933).
m For a discussion of the landlord's rights respecting future rent when
bankruptcy terminates an unexpired lease, see In Bonwit, Lennon & Co.,
36 Fed. Supp. 97 (D.C. Md. 1940).
11 -Geo. II, ch. 19, par. 18, 2 ALFIX. BRIT. 'STAT., n. 1, 990.
2 ALEx. BRiT. STAT., n. 1, 740, 755.
Charter & P.L.L. of Baltimore City (1949), § 741.
U0 McElroy v. Wright, 1 Balto. City Rep. 26 (1889).
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The application of this section is subject to some obscuri-
ties. The question is, to what do the words "the tenancy
mentioned in this subdivision of this Article" refer? If
they apply to Charter sections 728-730 inclusive, then
double rent may be collected by the landlord in leases from
year to year (Sec. 728), as well as leases for a fixed term
for any period less than a year (Sec. 729), and to tenancies
at will, at sufferance or per autre vie (Sec. 730). However,
if the application is limited to the tenancies described in
sections 729 and 730, then a tenant holding over at the
expiration of a lease from year to year is not bound for
double rent. The matter has not been passed upon by the
Court of Appeals, although there have been a number of
cases before that tribunal involving tenants holding over
at the expiration of leases from year to year.'
Increased only by agreement. A landlord cannot alter
or amend the terms of a tenancy by giving a written notice
of the change. Any increase in the amount of rent must
be accomplished by agreement of the parties; it cannot be
unilaterally increased by an act of the landlord.14 2
Necessity for demand. Once the relationship of land-
lord and tenant is established, failure of the landlord to
demand the rent does not justify the presumption that he
has released or extinguished his right to rent under the
lease, 14 as no demand is necessary for rent. 44
Not apportionable. Rent does not accrue from day to
day as interest does, but the entire rent falls due on the
rent day, is not apportionable with respect to time and,
unless otherwise specially stipulated, is always payable
by the party holding the estate on rent day to the owner of
the reversion at the rent day,145 except with respect to rent
when the lessor is a tenant for life and dies in mid-term. 4 "
Overpayment recoverable. When rent is overpaid due
to a mistake of fact by the tenant, he may recover the over-
payment back from the landlord, and as a private estate is
a complex conception, depending upon the facts and the
consequences thereof, a mistake of a person regarding his
I In Allegany County, there can be no action for doulble rent against a
tenant holding over, MD. LAws 1890, Ch. 265, Flack's Code of Public Local
Laws (1930), Art. 1, § 380.
I De Young v. Buchanan, 10 G. & J. 149 (1838).
"' Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319 (1882).
I" Offutt v. Trail, 4 H. & J. 20 (Md. 1815) ; Campbell v. Shipley, 41 Md.
81 (1874).
11 LATROBE, JusTicEs PRACTICE (1889) 176 (736); Martin v. Martin, 7
Md. 368 (1855).
"11 Geo. II, Ch. 19, § 15, 2 ALzx. BRIT. STAT., a. 1, 738.
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private legal rights may be regarded as a mistake of fact;
it is not less a fact because it involves a conclusion of law.
147
Receivers. A court appointed receiver is neither the
assignee in fact or by operation of law of the premises and
cannot be held liable as a tenant for use and occupation.
14
Services other than direct money payment. A covenant
to pay as rent taxes, water-rent and fire insurance prem-
iums, is sufficiently certain and definite as to make such
payments enforceable in the same manner as a money rent,
even though such provisions may create a rent which is
not uniform throughout the term of the lease.'49
Trustees. A trustee appointed to foreclose a mortgage
under the Charter of Baltimore City 5° is not clothed with
title to the mortgage; the title remains in the mortgagee.
Consequently, the holder of the reversion may proceed
against the mortgagor or mortgagee for a breach of the
covenant to pay rent.'5 ' When there is a decree for the sale
of the reversion in lands to which rent is incident, the
court may order any rent in arrear to be sold with such
estate, and the purchaser shall have the same right to
recover such rent by distress, entry or action, as if he had
been owner of the estate when the rent accrued.'52 If a
lease is made prior to a mortgage the purchaser at fore-
closure has no greater rights than the lessor, but leases
subsequent to the mortgage are not valid against the pur-
chaser at foreclosure.153
When due. The general rule is that rent is not due until
earned and therefore rent is payable at the end of term
or period unless otherwise agreed.' Such an agreement
can be implied. The actions of the parties at the inception
of the letting govern their rights thereafter, except as
amended by agreement. Thus, if rent is paid in advance
at the time of the letting it rent is payable in advance
thereafter. As rent may be paid by the tenant on Sunday,
if the rent falls due on a Sunday and is not paid, it is in
arrear on the following Monday and the landlord may then
",7B. & A. R.R. Co. v. Carolina Coach Co., 206 Md. 237, 111 A. 2d 464
(1955).
"I Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10 A. 309 (1887).
"' Theatrical Corp. v. Trust Co., 157 Md. 602, 146 A. 805 (1929); Feld-
meyer v. Werntz, 119 Md. 285, 86 A. 986 (1913).
110 Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) § 508.
'5 Williams v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 167 Md. 499, 175 A. 331 (1934); Hart
v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 169 Md. 446, 182 A. 322 (1936).
1522 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 16, § 160.
2m Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935) ; 5 MD. CODE (1957),
Art. 66, § 20.
"' Castleman v. Du Val, 89 Md. 657, 43 A. 821 (1899).
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distrain therefor.'55 However, there may be a question
arise because of our Sunday laws. 56
An obligation for the payment of a future rent cannot
be commuted into a present debt, as in advance of the rent
day there is no present debt for future payment.
157
Who may collect. Payment of installments of rent to
the husband in an estate by the entireties is sufficient dur-
ing the continuance of the marriage.15
Who may pay. If the party in possession is not the
tenant or his assignee then the landlord is not required
to accept a tender of ground rent due, but such payment
can be made by the next of kin of the tenant.159 Under the
Baltimore City Charter 6 ° the surviving spouse or any
member of the immediate family or household who has
occupied the premises with the deceased tenant may, upon
payment to the landlord of the current rent and rent in
arrears be substituted as tenant to the same extent as
the original tenant.
XI. ENFORCEMENT OF RENT
Baltimore City. Landlord's rights when rent is unpaid
are: (a) Housing accommodations - residences or dwell-
ings - Letting of less than three months - summary
ejectment exclusively. Letting of three months up to one
year - either summary ejectment or distress. Letting in
excess of one year - distress exclusively. (b) Commercial
or business accommodations. Letting of less than three
months - summary ejectment exclusively. Letting of
more than three months - distress exclusively.
Counties.'
XII. USE AND OCCUPATION
When a tenant occupies premises before completion of
renovation, his liability for use and occupation is the fair
Childs v. Edwards, 2 K.B. 753; 2 ALEX. BRIT. STAT., n. 1, 767.
MD. CODE (1957), Art. 27, § 492. The practitioner is referred to the
learned opinion of Judge Niles in Brennan v. Blouse, Baltimore City Court,
The Daily Record, August 29, 1956, in which the Sunday laws are examined,
although not in landlord-tenant litigation.
I Boulevard Corp. v. Stores Corp., 168 Md. 532, 178 A. 707 (1935).
1582 WiLsToN, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1959) 747-8. However, see Columbian
Carbon Co. v. fKight, 207 Md. 203, 209, 114 A. 2d 28, 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232
(1955), in which the Court of Appeals affirms previous holdings that since
the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts the wife shares
equally with the husband In the income from a tenancy by the entireties.
For a discussion of husband's agency for his wife as regards real estate
see Twilley v. Bromley, 192 Md. 465, 64 A. 2d 553 (1949).
'm Chesapeake Realty Co. v. 'Patterson, 138 Md. 244, 113 A. 725 (1921).
10 Charter & P.L.L. (1949) § 462.
'a See Rhynhart, Distre8s, 13 Md. L. Rev. 185 (1953).
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value of the uncompleted accommodations and not neces-
sarily the agreed rent.162 As regards city property, rents
and profits chargeable for the occupancy are confined to a
fair occupation rent for the purpose for which the premises
are adapted.163
When a tenant removes from demised premises in
obedience to a notice to quit, but leaves trash and rubbish
on the premises this does not amount to use and occupancy,
nor can the tenant be deemed to have held over.6 4
XIII. CONSTRUCTIVE AND PARTIAL EVICTION
In order that there be constructive eviction, the land-
lord's acts must involve a substantial interference with
tenant's enjoyment and must be of a grave and permanent
character. 6 ' If the landlord makes a tortious entry on the
lessee and expels him, it is a suspension of the rent for the
time the tenant is kept out; if the lessee regains possession
the rent will revive.' 6 An entry by the landlord without
the expulsion of the tenant does not produce a suspension
of the rent.67 When property is leased for a distillery and
the landlord refuses to execute documents required by the
United States showing his consent, then, since the tenant
is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the premises for
such a purpose, there is a constructive eviction as the lease
for use as a distillery would be a nugatory and incomplete
act and in an action in assumpsit for the rent the tenant
had the right of recoupment for his damage to the extent
of the rent.68 Partial eviction means more than mere tres-
pass and must be something of a permanent character done
by the landlord with the intention of depriving the tenant
of a portion of the premises. Hence a negligent excavation
by a landlord, resulting in a broken sewer pipe affecting
the tenants' use of the demised property, is not a defense to
a suit by landlord for the rent.'69
When deprivation of the beneficial use is not by the act
of the landlord, the tenant remains liable for the rent.170
Notice from a zoning enforcement officer prohibiting a par-
ticular use of premises does not amount to constructive
lGuilford Bldg. Co. v. Goldslorough, 140 Md. 159, 116 A. 913 (1922).10 McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425 (1869).
1612 TiFANY, n. 1, 1474, 64 L.R.A. 648.
15 Op. cit. ibid., 1260.
' Mackubin v. Whetcroft, 4 H. & McH. 135, 155 (Md. 1798).1 Martin v. Martin, 7 Md. 368 (1855).1 6 Grabenhorst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236 (1875).
Jackson v. Birgfeld, 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793 (1948).
Wagner v. White, 4 H. & J. 564 (Md. 1815).
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eviction by the landlord. To constitute constructive evic-
tion the act complained of must have been done by the
landlord or by his procurement with the intent and effect
of depriving the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the
leased premises.'7 '
Most commercial leases prohibit the use of the premises
by the tenant for any but a specified business. If the busi-
ness authorized by the lease becomes illegal then it would
appear that the familiar rule of contract law that super-
vening objective impossibility rescinds would become effec-
tive and the lease would be terminated by the passage
of the statute.'72 However, when premises are leased to
be used exclusively for saloon and restaurant purposes
and subsequently a liquor licensing authority forbids its
use for saloon purposes with which decision the landlord
has nothing to do, then as the lessee is not entirely deprived
of the beneficial use of the premises there is no construc-
tive eviction and the tenant remains liable for the rent.'73
If by law a use of premises theretofore legal is prohibited,
there may result an impossibility of performance or a
frustration of the purposes of the lease that will allow
the tenant to terminate the lease when the tenants do not
bind themselves to pay rent regardless of such happening.
When a tenant receives notice from an administrative
authority challenging his use of premises, he is under an
obligation to pursue his remedies until impossibility of
performance becomes a fact, as distinguished from a
possibility. 7 1
Zoning and use restrictions. A letting for a use pro-
hibited by zoning law is not necessarily impossible of per-
formance when there is an administrative authority with
power to vary the zoning law. 75
In some jurisdictions a constructive eviction by the
landlord operates to suspend the rent.176 It arises only by
the act of the landlord 77 amounting to serious interference
with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises, such as main-
tenance of an unsafe wall, depriving tenant of the use of a
part of the demised premises17s or maintenance of defec-
tive plumbing, causing foul and offensive odors.179 There
7 McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 122 A. 2d 555 (1956).
1" BRA.NTry, CON TACTS (2nd ed. 1912) § 195.
1 Standard 'Brewing Co. v. Well, 129 Md. 487, 99 A. 661 (1916).
, McNally v. Mkoser, supra, n. 171.
I" McNally v. Moser, ibid.
1712 MCADAM, n. 1, § 419, 2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1265, In. 34.
*7 2 McADAM, ibid., § 404.
1'7 Op. cit. ibid., § 407.
179 Op. cit. ibid., § 409.
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is no constructive eviction when the tenant is inconveni-
enced by the making of repairs.180 It has been held that a
tenant constructively but not actually evicted has the right
of recoupment or counterclaim on a suit by the landlord
for the rent. 8' Such constructive evictions have been held
to exist for breach of a covenant to heat, denial of the use
of an elevator, shutting off the water supply, defective
plumbing, and breach of a covenant to repair. 82
The majority, and apparently the Maryland, view seems
to be that there is no constructive eviction suspending the
rent unless the tenant moves, and that acts of omission
by the landlord, such as the failure to supply power, heat,
or elevator service, or failure to perform a contract to
repair, do not amount to constructive eviction.'
Criminal liability. Any person who shall:
".... wilfully deprive a tenant of ingress to or egress
from his dwelling, or who shall without the consent of
the tenant diminish essential services to the tenant,
such as the providing of gas, electricity, water, heat,
light, furniture, furnishings, or similar services, to
which, under the expressed or implied terms of the
tenancy the tenant may be entitled, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof, shall be
subject to a fine not exceeding .. .$50 and imprison-
ment of not more than Ten (10) days, or both, in the
discretion of the court, for each and every offense.' '1 85
XIV. TENANT'S RIGHT TO REcOUPMENT
In a suit for rent the defendant has the right of recoup-
ment for a breach or nonperformance by the landlord, to
the extent of the rent, as when a lessee pays under com-
pulsion taxes or mortgage interest owed by the lessor, he
is entitled to deduct such payments from the rent.8 When
a sub-tenant pays rent due from a lessee to the original
lessor, he is entitled to deduct it from any rent he may
owe the lessee. 87 A tenant deprived of the beneficial use
of premises by the failure of the landlord to make repairs
contracted for, is entitled to an allowance for the propor-
tion of the rent for the time he was so deprived. 8
Op. cit. ibid., §§ 408, 414.
's' 2 UNDERHnLL, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1909) § 698.
1m Op. cit. ibid., §§ 678, 680-683.
1812 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1264.
Biggs v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892) ; of. op. cit. ibid., 1271.
'Baltimore City Ord. No. 769, May 27, 1942.
_ Woodcock v. Pope, 154 Md. 135, 140 A. 76 (1928).
VEN ABLE, n. 1, 59, 62.
SBiggs v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892).
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XV. REPAIRS
There is no implied covenant requiring a landlord to
make repairs'89 so that when there is no agreement as to
payment for repairs it is not the duty of the landlord to
make repairs after the tenancy begins. '0 Unless compelled
by agreement, the landlord is not bound to make any re-
pairs during the term of a lease, so that a covenant is never
implied that a lessor will make repairs.'9 ' Even though a
landlord may be under no duty to make repairs, he can
be held liable therefor in a suit by a third party who makes
the repairs, notwithstanding that the order was given to
the third party by the tenant, provided there is sufficient
evidence to show tenant to have been landlord's agent for
this purpose. The mere existence of a landlord-tenant re-
lationship does not constitute the tenant as the agent of
the landlord. But the landlord-tenant relationship does not
preclude an agency status reached by express agreement
or authorization. 92
However, when the tenant makes repairs at the request
of the landlord, the tenant may be entitled to reimburse-
ment.'93 When a landlord contracts to make repairs and
improvements and does not do so, the tenant has an action
for breach of the agreement, in which the measure of
damages is the difference between the fair rental value of
the unrepaired premises and the agreed rent.'9 Likewise,
when the landlord has expressly agreed to make repairs,
the tenant may, in a suit for rent, recoup to the extent of
the landlord's rent claim any damages sustained as a direct
result of the landlord's non-performance, including the
cost of the repairs.'95
Even though there is a covenant by a landlord to make
repairs, this covenant usually is independent of the cove-
nant to pay rent and a failure to repair is no defense to an
action founded upon nonpayment of rent, although there
is obiter dicta in the Biggs case to the effect that when the
repairs required are of a trifling nature requiring but a
small outlay of money, the lessee may make the repairs
and claim an allowance out of the rent.19 If the covenants,
Gluck v. M. & C.C. of Balto, 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895) ; Whitcomb
v. Mason, 102 Md. 275, 62 A. 749 (1905).
n0 Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 A. 496 (1902).
10' Woodcock v. Pope, 154 Md. 135, 140 A. 76 (1928).
"'Taetle v. Livezey Lumber 0o., 217 Md. 270, 142 A. 2d 821 (1958).
"Clark & Stevens v. Gerke, 104 Md. 504,65 A. 326 (1906).
B "Bggs v. McCurley, 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892).
Cramer v. Baugher, 130 Md. 212, 100 A. 507 (1917).
"WILSTON, CONTRACTS (1936) 887 F; Biggs v. McCurley, supra, n. 194,
415.
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by intention of the parties, are dependent then non-per-
formance by landlord is a defense to a claim for rent.197
In a summary proceeding to recover possession because of
nonpayment of rent, the tenant cannot assert a counter-
claim for breach of the landlord.18
While neither the landlord nor the tenant, in the
absence of an agreement, is under a legal duty to make
repairs, any dangerous condition of the premises which
imperils either the occupant or members of the community
is forbidden. Under Ordinance 384, approved March 6,
1941, the Commissioner of Health of Baltimore City is
empowered to require the occupant or tenant of premises
to maintain them in a sanitary condition; 199 likewise, the
Commissioner is empowered to order that premises which
are in any way detrimental to life or health be altered or
improved by the owner."0
In Givner v. Commissioner of Health,2"' the Court of
Appeals discussed the powers in the Commissioner of
Health to require installation of inside toilets, prohibit
the use of lead paint, and require a particular dwelling
to be vacated, all in the interests of public health or safety;
and held generally that if a particular regulation is fairly
debatable, the "courts will not substitute their judgment
for that of the official" charged with the duty of promulga-
tion or enforcement.20 2
XVI. TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
A. Notice to Quit
Here, as in summary ejectment, complexities arise be-
cause the subject is affected by two statutes: one, the
general law affecting all of the counties; and second, the
public local law of Baltimore City. It is provided by
the Code:
"Where the public general law and the public local
law of any county, city, town or district are in conflict,
the public local law shall prevail.
23
Brady v. Brady, 140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922).
2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1766.
§ 156 A.
§§ 156 B, 156 C.
'207 Md. 184, 113 A. 2d 899 (1955).
w2 See also State v. Reisfeld, The Daily Record, Feb. 25, 1955, (Criminal
Court of Baltimore City) where Niles, C.J., and Duer, J., held that the
holder of the bare legal title is subject to the penalty provisions of Sec-
tions 112 to 119 of Article 12 of the Baltimore City Code of 1950, for failure
to remedy conditions dangerous to health after having been served with
appropriate notice by the Health Commissioner.
1 MD. CoiE (1957), Art. 1, § 13.
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1. Public General Law
The Code provides:
"In all cases where any interest in real estate shall
be let or leased for any definite term or at will and the
lessor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns
shall desire to repossess the same after the expiration
of the term for which it was demised and shall give
notice in writing one month before the expiration of
said term or determination of said will to the tenant
or to the person actually in possession of the premises
to remove from the same at the end of said term, and if
the said tenant or person in actual possession shall re-
fuse to comply therewith the lessor, his heirs, execu-
tors, administrators or assigns may make complaint
thereof in writing to any justice of the peace of the
county or city wherein such real estate is situate.
'20 4
"The provision of the preceding sections shall apply
to all cases of tenancies from year to year, tenancies
by the month and by the week; provided, that in case
of tenancies from year to year in the counties, a notice
in writing shall be given three months before the ex-
piration of the current year of the tenancy, except
that in case of farm tenancies, the notice shall be given
six (6) months before the expiration of the current
year of the tenancy; and in monthly or weekly ten-
ancies, a notice in writing of one month or one week,
as the case may be, shall be so given; and the same
proceeding shall apply, so far as may be, to cases of
forcible entry and detainer; and the benefit of all such
proceedings shall enure to the heirs, executors, admin-
istrators, or assigns of the owner of such estate as the
case may be. In case of removal of such proceedings
under a writ of certiorari, a sufficient record thereof
shall be the original papers with a copy of the judg-
ment and entries by the justice under his hand and
seal. This section, so far as the same relates to notices,
shall not apply to Baltimore City. Nothing contained
in the laws relating to landlord and tenant contracts,
shall be construed as preventing the parties to any
such contract, by agreement in writing, from substitut-
ing a longer or shorter notice to quit than heretofore
required or to waive all such notice, provided the
property to which such contract pertains is located in
'5 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 53, § 1. § § 2 and 3 deal with tenants holding
over.
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any special taxing area, or incorporated town of Mont-
gomery County."2 '
"When the tenant shall give notice by parol to the
landlord or to his agent or representatives, at least one
month before the expiration of the lease or tenancy in
all cases except in cases of tenancies from year to year,
and at least three months' notice in all cases of tenancy
from year to year in the counties, except in all cases
of farm tenancy the notice shall be six months, of the
intention of such tenant to remove at the end of that
year and to surrender possession of the tenement at
that time, and the landlord, his agent or representative
shall prove said notice from the tenant by legal and
competent testimony, it shall not be necessary for the
said landlord, his agent or representative to prove a
written notice to the tenant, but the proof of such
notice from the tenant as aforesaid shall entitle his
landlord to recover possession of said tenement under
the provisions of this article. This section shall not
apply to Baltimore City.
20 6
2. Baltimore City Local Law and Practice
Leases for years. At common law, no notice to quit is
necessary to terminate a tenancy for years at the expira-
tion of the term named in the lease."° However, if the
landlord desires to avail himself of the summary remedy
provided by Article 53, Section 1,20 he must give three
month's written notice to the tenant before the expiration
of the term. 9 If the landlord fails to give the notice, if
any, provided for in the lease, or the notice required by
Article 53, Section 1, or that required by the Charter, Sec-
tions 728-731,21 ° then being barred from the summary pro-
ceedings which are brought in the Peoples' Court, he must
proceed in an action of ejectment in a court of higher
jurisdiction.21'
When notice to quit or notice of termination is given
with respect to a lease containing notice provisions, such
notice must be in accordance with the provisions and terms
-'Ibid., § 7.
Ibid., § 8.
201 Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 178 A. 113 (1935) ; 2 TAYLOR, LANDLORD
AND TENANT (1904) § 465; 2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1419.
M0 5 MD. CODE (1957).
m Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A. 2d 329 (1946) ; Darling Shops v.
Balto. Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948), noted
9 Md. L. Rev. 362 (1948).
210 5 MD. CODE (1957) ; Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949).
2u 2 'PoE, n. 1, § 482.
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of the lease itself. 12 In the absence of estoppel or waiver
by the landlord, the receipt by him of an oral notice of
termination does not preclude him from insisting upon
the requirements of a written notice as set out in the
lease.213 When a lease for years contains no such pro-
visions, then the notice must be given at least one month
before the termination date of the lease.214
Leases from year to year. When tenant is in occupancy
under a lease from year to year, such as when he takes
possession under a void lease and pays a yearly rent, the
notice to quit necessary to be given by landlord upon which
to base a suit against a tenant holding over is the same
as that for a lease from year to year - i.e., ninety days.21 5
3. Notice by Landlord
"Where any lands or tenements in the City of Balti-
more are held from year to year, the tenancy shall be
terminated if the lessor give to the tenant ninety days'
notice before the end of the year."216
If land or tenements be held in said city by tenancy at
will, at sufferance or per autre vie, thirty days' notice by
the landlord or reversioner to the tenant or occupant shall
terminate such tenancy at the expiration of thirty days.217
The Code provision is one month's notice;218 the Charter
provision is thirty days. A reconciliation of these pro-
visions is: (a) If the lease is one from month to month, then
notice must be given at least one month prior to the termi-
nal date on which the letting is to end. As examples: -
If the day on which rent is due is the fifth of the month,
then the notice must be served not later than midnight of
the fourth and the tenancy will be terminated at midnight
on the fourth of the following month. If the day on which
rent is due is the first of the month, then the notice must
be served not later than midnight of the last day of the
month preceding the "notice month" at the end of which
the tenancy is terminated. As regards tenancies beginning
S2 upra, n. 210, § 735.
-18 Leonard v. Apartments Company, 161 Isd. 451, 157 A. 752 (1932).
214 5 MD. CoDE (1957), Art. 53, § 1.
215 Darling Shops v. Balto. Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d
677 (1948), noted, 9 Md. L. Rev. 362 (1948). See this annotation for a
discussion bf the incidents of a tenancy implied in fact by the tenant
entering under a void or unenforceable lease and the notice necessary to
be given by the landlord to terminate such a tenancy.
", Charter & P.L.L. of 'Baltimore City (1949) § 728.
17 Ibid., § 730.
2185 MD. Com (1957), Art. 53, § 1.
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on the first of the month, the provisions of the City Charter
cannot be applied because of two inconsistent factors: -
(1) our Julian calendar contains months of 28, 29, 30 or 31
days, as the case may be; and (2) rent is not apportionable.
Consequently, the provisions of Article 53, Section 1 con-
trol, and a notice of termination must be given on the day
prior to the first of the month. There is room for argument
that when the particular month contains thirty-one days,
and a notice is served on the first of the month, under
Baltimore City local law since there are thirty clear days
between the date of service and date of termination, the
tenancy is terminated. In view of the fact that tenancies
may be terminated as regards months continuing as few
as twenty-eight days, it would seem logical that the same
rule should apply to all tenancies - so that as regards
tenancies beginning on the first of the month, (because of
the ambiguity contained in the local law in Baltimore
City) notice to quit must be given prior to the first of the
month of termination of the tenancy. (b) If the tenancy
is one from week to week, then neither the Charter pro-
vision nor the Code provision can be literally applied.
The practice in such case is to give five weeks notice,
beginning with the rent day next succeeding the service
of the notice to quit.
4. Notice by Tenant
A tenant may terminate a tenancy from year to year,
from month to month, from week to week, at will, or at
sufferance by giving to the landlord thirty days' notice
previous to the end of the term.21 Notice by a tenant must
be in writing.220
Count of time. As rent is not apportionable, neither the
landlord nor the tenant can give a notice by which a ten-
ancy is terminated in mid-term, as for example, a notice
to quit terminating the tenancy on the fifteen of the month,
when the tenancy is one from month to month, with rent
due in advance on the first of the month. Therefore, the
count of time on a notice to quit begins with the next rent
day following the service of the notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
"Such notice shall be sufficient in form if it con-
tains a request by the landlord to the tenant to leave
the premises, or if it states the intentions of the tenant
Sa Charter & P.L.L. of Baltimore City (1949) § 728.
m Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to leave the same, and it need not state the time when
the tenant is requested to leave the same, or when the
tenant intends to do So.221
Form of notice to quit:
"To Tenant: As I am desirous to have again and
repossess the premises which you now hold of me as
tenant, I hereby give you notice to vacate and remove
from the same at the end of the term of your tenancy,
w hich w ill expire on ...................................
Who may give notice.
"Notice on the part of the landlord may be given
either by the original lessor or by the person or per-
sons succeeding him in the ownership of the reversion.
One having merely an equitable title based on a con-
tract for the sale to him of the reversion has no
authority to give it. * * * An authorized agent of the
landlord may give the notice on behalf of his principal,
and he may . . . give it in his own name, if he has
general control over the property, as when he is an
agent to let and also to receive rents . . . while if
acting under a special authority for this particular
purpose he must, . . . give the notice in the name of
his principal. * * * "222
A notice to quit need not be signed by the landlord in per-
son. It is sufficient if it clearly shows on whose behalf it
is sent, to what property it relates, and of what facts it is
intended to inform the tenant. A landlord's agent having
authority to rent a property is presumed to have like
authority to give to the tenant a notice to quit.223
"'When the reversion is transferred, the proper per-
son to give the notice is the grantee and not the origi-
nal lessor. A purchaser of the reversion cannot give
the requisite notice before he has received his deed.
The grantee of the reversion may take advantage of a
notice to quit given by his grantor prior to the con-
veyance of the reversion'."224
Quaere, can there be circumstances under which the
notice may be given by the purchaser before a conveyance
"I Charter & P.L.L., 8upra, n. 219, § 733.
2 TIFFANY, n. 1, 1438, § 198.
O'Benton v. Stiokes, 109 Md. 117, 71 A. 532 (1908).
2 Walker v. Kirwan, 137 Md. 139, 111 A. 775 (120).
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of the property, on the theory that the contract purchaser
is the equitable owner?225 When the object is to secure
possession for the purchaser of tenant-occupied property,
the practice is to give the notice in name of both the
vendor-owner and the purchaser. The naming of an un-
necessary person as landlord is treated as surplusage.
Service of notice. The notice required by the preceding
sections shall be in writing and served on the tenant or
left at his place of abode or business, or served on his agent
or servant, or served on any occupant of the premises; and
if there be no person living on the premises the same may
be served by being set upon a conspicuous part of the
premises. 26
Irregular notices. Service of a notice addressed to a
wife (being the tenant) upon her husband (her agent in
renting and living on the premises) is a sufficient notice.
A misdescription of the premises, or a mistatement of dates
which cannot mislead will not vitiate the notice; nor need
it be directed to the person. Even if directed by a wrong
name, such as the husband instead of the wife, if she keeps
it without objection, the error is waived.227 However, refer-
ence is made to Wm. Penn Supply v. Watterson,228 which
holds in a mechanic's lien case that agency as between
husband and wife may not be implied from marital status.
Premature terminal date in notice. At nisi prius it has
been decided that a notice to quit on April 28, when the
expiration of the lease was February 28, was defective and
did not terminate the tenancy.22 9 However, as a notice is
good if upon the whole it is intelligible and so certain that
the tenant cannot reasonably misunderstand it, an obvious
mistake in some part will not invalidate it if it is otherwise
so explicit that the party receiving it cannot be misled.23 0
If the person who gives the notice becomes committed
thereby even though there may be an error in the terminal
date, the notice is not thereby vitiated.231
As a notice to quit can be given only by the landlord
or on his behalf and as the tenant is bound by construc-
tive notice as to ownership as shown by the Land Records,
then the tenant may rely on the title as shown by the
Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445, 87 A.L.R. 1500 (1931).
Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) § 732.
Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581 (1876).
2218 Md. 291, 146 A. 2d 420 (1958).
Matthews v. Whiteford, 119 Md. 122, 85 A. 1040 (1912).
2Cook v. Creswell, 44 Md. 581 (1876) ; Benfon v. Stokes, 109 Md. 117,
121, 71 A. 532 (1908) ; Walker v. Kirwan, 137 Md. 139, 111 A. 775 (1920).
m Dugan v. Yourtee, People's Court No. 13329-48, affd. in Baltimore City
Court by Sherbow, J.
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Land Records and this regardless of when the deed was
recorded. By Article 21, Section 16,232 a deed recorded
after six months is constructive notice from and after the
date on which it is recorded.233 A notice to quit or a suit
against a tenant holding over can be effective or main-
tained only when brought by the record title owner or by
a landlord to whom attornment has been made, as persons
dealing with the owner of the reversion are bound only
by the title shown by the Land Records.23 4
B. Surrender and Abandonment
A surrender of demised premises by a tenant before the
expiration of his term does not relieve him from liability
for rent unless the surrender is accepted by the landlord;
and a reletting by the landlord at the risk of the tenant
is not an acceptance of surrender by the landlord.235 How-
ever, in any such reletting the landlord faces the hazard
that his act may discharge the tenant's liability if the land-
lord relets the premises for a period longer than the re-
mainder of the term.236
As a notice to quit by a landlord or a notice of termina-
tion by a tenant must be in writing, if the tenant removes
from premises held by him under a tenancy from month to
month, without a surrender accepted by the landlord, then
the tenant may be liable for rent accruing after the re-
moval, and beyond the succeeding month's rent.23 7 When
a tenant abandons demised property without legal notice
to the landlord he remains liable for the rent.38
C. Fire
When premises become untenable because of fire or
unavoidable accident, the letting being for seven years or
less, the tenancy is thereby terminated and all liability
for rent ceases proportionately. 23 9 However, if the lease
provides for such a contingency, then the provisions of the
statute are inoperative.24 ° When premises are merely dam-
aged by fire so that part thereof becomes untenantable,
the lease is not thereby terminated, as "untenantable by
m 2 MD. CoDE (1959).
Im Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892).
2" Gable v. Preachers' Fund Society, 59 Md. 455 (1883).
2 Oldewurtel v. Wiesenfeld, 97 Md. 165, 54 A. 969 (1903).
2Ralph v. Dailey, 293 Pa. 90, 141 A. 640, 61 A.L.R. 763 (1927); see
annotation at 61 A.L.R. 773.
Kinsey v. Minnick, 43 Md. 112 (1875).
2 Emrich v. Union Stock Yard Co., 86 Md. 482,38 A. 943 (1897).
"MD CoDE (1959), Art. 53, § 37.
wO Spear v. Baker, 117 Md. 570, 84 A. 62 (1912).
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fire" means a permanently untenantable condition render-
ing further occupancy impossible and necessitating not
merely repairs, but rebuilding.24'
Where a lease provided for its termination upon sub-
stantial destruction of the premises by fire, the elements,
or any other cause not the fault of the tenant, it was held
that such destruction must make the premises permanently
untenantable, or be so extensive as to require practically
the equivalent of a new building. When the cost of repairs
amounted to $5,000 to a building valued at $100,000, and
were completed within a month, the lessee was denied the
right to terminate.242
D. Judicial Sales
As a writ of possession under Article 66, Section 19,243
to a purchaser of lands sold at mortgage foreclosure is of
the same nature as a writ of possession or habere facias
possessionem under Article 75, Section 42,44 the rights
respecting property sold at mortgage foreclosure or on
execution against the occupant or tenant are as follows:
(a) Under Code Article 66, Section 20,245 a purchaser at a
mortgage foreclosure sale has all of the rights against the
tenant that the mortgagor had. Consequently, the pur-
chaser may file appropriate actions in People's Court to
the same extent as could the landlord or owner whose
estate was sold.248 (b) The purchaser at a judicial sale
may secure out of the court which ordered the sale a writ
of possession against the occupants of the property, con-
sisting either of the mortgagor or debtor or those who hold
under him. (c) An assignee of the purchaser at a judicial
sale may not have a writ of possession out of the court
which directed the sale, as in Turner v. Waters,247 where it
was held that the right to a writ of possession applied for by
a purchaser at an execution sale, did not devolve upon the
purchaser's administrator.
XVII. LANDLoRD's LmN
A landlord has no lien for rent unless he distrains,248
nor does he have an equitable lien upon property taken in
21 Barry v. Herring, 153 Md. 457, 138 A. 266 (1927).
Standard, Inc. v. Alexander, Inc., 214 Md. 214, 133 A. 2d 460 (1957).
" '5 MD. CODE (1957).
"'7 MD. CODE (1957).
I'Supra, n. 243.
" Smith v. Pritchett, 168 Md. 347, 349, 178 A. 113 (1935).
-714 Md. 62 (1859).
"8 Buckey v. Snouffer, 10 Md. 149 (1856) ; Stewart v. Clark, 60 Md. 310
(1883) ; Mears v. Perine, 156 Md. 56, 143 A. 591, 62 A.L.R. 1100 (1928).
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distress and replevied by the tenant.249 A landlord has a
quasi-lien on the goods of his tenant subject to distress
even before distress levied for arrearages of rent, but this
potential right does not become a lien on the goods until
they have actually been seized under a distress. This quasi-
lien may be converted to a lien, even without a distress,
under the Statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14,250 and if the landlord's
claim for rent is properly established it will take preced-
ence over the debt on which an attachment issues and he
is entitled to be first paid out of the proceeds of the prop-
erty condemned.251 If a landlord permits distrained goods
to remain in a tenant's possession for an unreasonable
length of time, then a bona fide purchaser without notice
of the distress takes the goods free of the landlord's lien.
Three months has been held to be an unreasonable time.252
In bankruptcy. A landlord has no lien upon distrain-
able goods passing into the hands of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy unless he levied his distraint before the filing of
the petition.25 3 If distress is levied by a landlord before
the tenant's adjudication as a bankrupt, the landlord is
entitled to priority for his accrued rent, out of the pro-
ceeds of sale of the bankrupt's assets by the bankruptcy
trustee.254 The lien acquired by a distress within four
months of a bankruptcy petition is not voidable as it is
one secured other than through legal proceedings.255
A. Attaching or Execution Creditor
By 8 Anne, Ch. 14, an execution creditor must pay rent
in arrear for a period of not less than one year before the
goods and chattels executed upon, may be removed by the
officer.25 The same principle applies to the rights of the
landlord against an attaching creditor.25 7 Therefore, when
goods are sold on execution by the sheriff, the landlord is
entitled to be paid the rent accrued and unpaid before the
levying of the execution, provided he gives reasonable
24 Gelston v. Rullman, 15 Md. 260 (1860).
21 2 ALEX., n. 1, 680; Gaither v. Stockbridge, 67 Md. 222, 9 A. 632, 10
A. 309 (1887) ; Calvert Bldg. & Const. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A.
355 (1928).
"IThomson v. Balto. & Susq. Steam Co., 33 Md. 312 (1870).
Lamotte v. Wisner, 51 Md. 543 (1879).
"I Irving Trust Co. v. Burke, 65 F. 2d 730 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Loan Service
v. Grossman, 165 Md. 478, 170 A. 183 (1934).
In re Seward, 8 F. Supp. 865 (D.C. Md. 1934).
v1 In re Potee Brick Co. of Baltimore City, 179 Fed. 525 (D.C. Md. 1910).
12 ALEX., n. 1, 681.
1 First Nat'l Bk. v. Corp. Comm., 161 Md. 508, 157 A. 748, 86 A.L.R.
1407 (1932).
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notice to the sheriff or constable,25 and whether or not the
goods are removed from the premises.259 The notice given
by landlord to the constable to sell under a fi fa must state
under oath the amount of rent due.260
If the goods are not removed from the premises then
the landlord has no action against the constable under the
statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14,261 if they be sold on the premises,
a motion by the landlord that the constable pay the rent
due out of the money in his hands is appropriate.262
When goods are removed from demised premises by the
sheriff under a writ of attachment, there being no rent due
at the time of removal, the landlord has no claim against
the proceeds of the sale, as he has no right to follow and
distrain on the goods.263 As the purpose of the statute is
to protect the landlord's right to distrain, there is no such
priority in landlord's claims arising in Baltimore City,
when the term of the lease is three months or less, for the
right to distrain in such cases has been taken away and
the right to summarily eject substituted.264 In a suit for
taking goods under a void attachment, the defendant may
mitigate damages by proving payment of rent in arrear to
the landlord pursuant to 8 Anne, although such payment
must be either compulsory or by court order." 5
B. Bankruptcy, Insolvency and Receivership
"Whenever any person or corporation shall make
an assignment for the benefit of his or its creditors, or
shall be adjudicated insolvent, or shall be adjudicated
bankrupt, or shall be dissolved as a corporation, or a
receiver is appointed to take possession of his or its
2 POE, n. 1, § 635.
Washington v. Williamson, 23 Md. 244 (1865).
MD. CODE (1959), Art, 53, § 23 - Suggested forms are as follows:
Form of landlord's notice. "To . . . Constable. Take notice that
the sum of . . . dollars for . . . month's rent on the property . . .
street . . . County, Maryland, due at . . . last, is now due to me
from ... , on which premises were certain goods now in your pos8Cssion
by virtue of a writ of execution issued at the suit of . . . against . . ."
Form of affidavit. "Be it remembered, that on . .. before me, the
subscriber, a Judge of the People's Court of Baltimore City, per-
sonally appeared .... and made oath in due form of law, that . . .is
justly and bona fide indebted to him in the sum of ... dollars and...
cents, for rent in arrear and already due to him for the property... ;
and that he, the said . . . , hath not received, either directly or in-
directly, any part or parcel of the said rent, so claimed to be due and
in arrear, or any security or satisfaction for the same [Except the
credits (if any) given], to the best of his knowledge and belief."Supra, n. 256, 680, 686.
Washington v. Williams, supra, n. 259.
White v. Hoeninghaus, 74 Md. 127, 21 A. 700 (1891).
Putman's Sons v. Van Buren, 1 Balto. City Rep. 130 (1890).
2 6 Wanamaker v. Bowes, 36 Md. 42 (1872).
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property or estate, in the distribution of the property
or estate of such person or corporation, all the money
owing from such person or corporation for rent of any
real or leasehold property in this State due not more
than three months, but not actually distrained for,
before the execution of such assignment or the filing
of the bill or petition for such receiver, dissolution or
adjudication, shall constitute a lien on, and shall be
paid in full out of, the distrainable property of such
person or corporation, to the same extent but no fur-
ther than if distress for said rent had been levied by
the landlord before such execution or filing. '286
This preference may be lost.267
C. Decedent's Estates
A landlord having a claim for distrainable rent against
a deceased tenant has, of course, no problem if there are
sufficient assets in the estate. However, if the assets are
insufficient, the landlord's rights are not too clearly defined.
Claim in Orphans Court. Under the Code the landlord
may file claim in the Orphans Court.
"If the claim be for rent there shall be produced
the lease itself, or the deposition of some credible wit-
ness or witnesses, or an acknowledgment in writing of
the deceased, establishing the contract, and the time
which hath elapsed during which rent was chargeable,
and a statement of the sum due for such rent, with an
oath of the creditor endorsed thereon, 'that no part of
the sum due for said rent, or any security or satisfac-
tion for the same hath been received, except what (if
any) is credited', and if the creditor be an assignee,
there shall be such oath of the original creditor with
respect to the time of the assignment."26 s
If his claim is to be a preferred claim, then:
"The proof of a claim for rent in arrear, so as to
render the same a preferred claim, shall be the proofs
and vouchers for rent aforesaid; and proof that the
claim is such that a distress therefor might be levied
4 MD. CODE (1959), Art. 47, § 16.
A discussion of the rights of conflicting rights and claims when there
is insufficient money to pay claims will be found in Easter v. Tatelbaum,
198 Md. 636, 84 A. 2d 914 (1951). The Statute of 8 Anne, Ch. 14, 2 ALEx.,
n. 1, 680, is not superseded or abrogated by this Act; In re Seward, 8 F.
Supp. 865 (D.C. Md. 1934).
8 MD. CODE (1959), Art. 93, § 97.
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on said deceased's goods and chattels in the hands of
the administrator; but the preference given for rent
is not to impair the landlord's right of distress if he
should think it proper to exercise it. '269
In the settlement of a decedent's estate, after taxes due
and in arrear, claims for rent in arrear against the decedent
for which a distress might be levied by law are preferred
debts,70 it is essential that a proper voucher be filed or the
claim will not be given a preferred status.2 ' Attention is
particularly called to the provisions of Article 93, Sec-
tion 6, subsection (a),27' which apparently limits a land-
lord's preferred claim to rent for a period not more than
three months. Assuming the proper form of claim is filed,
then the claim for distrainable rent is payable as a pre-
ferred claim immediately after payment of taxes due and
in arrear.7 3 It appears that a number of expense categories
are paid before rent, or, for that matter, taxes. Article 93,
Section 6,' 74 dealing with the order of priority of disburse-
ments (as distinguished from debts) treats a number of
items, including funeral expenses, as having priority over
all debts, including a landlord's preferred claim. Another
guide to the legislative intent to protect funeral expenses
may be found in Article 81, Section 202 (c) ,275 which gives
taxes priority over all debts excepting necessary funeral
expenses.
Distress. Article 93, Section 98,2' 6 provides that "prefer-
ence given for rent is not to impair the landlord's right of
distress if he should think it proper to exercise it". A land-
lord may distrain during the term, after the death of the
tenant and before administration granted, for rent due and
in arrear.2 " While the case of Longwell v. Ridinger,278
deals with the preferred status of the landlord's claim for
distrainable rent in the Orphans Court, there is obiter dicta
in this case that a landlord may distrain after letters of
administration have issued on the estate of the deceased
tenant.
Ibid., § 98.
2" Calvert Bldg. & Coonst. Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 A. 355 (1928).
11 Maynadier v. Armstrong, 98 Md. 175, 56 A. 357 (1903).
928 MD. CoDE (1959).
278 8 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 93, § 130.
"8 MD. CODE (1959).
7 MD. CODE (1959).
S8 MD. CODE (1957).
-Keller v. Weber, 27 Md. 660 (1867).
21 Gill 57 (Md. 1843).
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XVIII. TORT LIABILITY
The liability of a landlord in tort arises from a breach
of a duty assumed by contract or imposed by law. As an
example of the latter, when there is more than a single
tenant the landlord is responsible for the condition of hall-
ways and other rooms used in common7 9 and is liable for
damages caused by his failure to remedy defects in the
appliances or parts of the building over which he retains
control.2"' When in a multiple unit dwelling inadequate
precautions by the landlord cause rat infestation in the
portions over which the landlord retains control, resulting
in a tenant being infected with typhus, the landlord may
be held liable for the damage resulting to tenant or his
family.281 A landlord may be liable to third parties if
premises are unsafe when leased and property is of a public
character.8 2 As regards hazards in a recreation room main-
tained by a landlord in a multiple dwelling for the conveni-
ence of the tenants (thus not necessary for use in connec-
tion with portions of the building leased by them), there
is no duty owed by the landlord to a person not a tenant
injured in such a room while using it without the knowl-
edge of the landlord. The injured person, being a tres-
passer or bare licensee, has no claim for injury against
the landlord despite being of tender years.8 '
The question of negligence in maintaining a dangerous
place depends upon whether such place of danger is in the
natural order of things or whether it is unusual in the
experience of reasonably prudent persons. Where a tenant
slipped and fell on linoleum-treaded outside steps during
a snowstorm, plaintiff was denied recovery because it was
not shown such use of linoleum was unusual or out of
common experience.284
A landlord may be liable to guests or customers of his
lessee only to the same extent that he is liable to the tenant
himself. However, where the premises are to be used for
public or quasi-public purposes, the landlord must use ordi-
2Whitcomb v. Mason, 102 Md. 275, 62 A. 749 (1905). Landay v. Cohn,
220 Md. 24, 150 A. 2d 739 (1959), points out that the use must be within
the confines of the invitation.
Kinnier v. J. R. McAdams, Inc., 142 Md. 305, 120 A. 838 (1923) ; Sezzin
v. Stark, 187 Md. 241, 49 A. 2d 742 (1946) ; Ross v. Belzer, 199 Md. 187, 85
A. 2d 799 (1952) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 360. See note, Iandlord's
liability for injury due to defects in inside passageways and chambers
used in common by tenants, 25 A.L.R. 2d 444.
281 State, use of Pumpbrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., U. S. Dist.
Ct.; Chesnut, J.; Daily Record, Aug. 20, 1949.
Smith v. Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92 (1901).
Levine v. Miller, 218 Md. 74, 145 A. 2d 418 (1958).
Seaman v. State, use of Jeter, 213 Md. 359, 131 A. 2d 871 (1957).
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nary diligence to see that the property leased is in a rea-
sonably safe condition at the time of the lease. Thus, when
a patron of a tavern is injured when falling down a flight
of steps, if there is evidence that the stairway was unsafe
or potentially dangerous at the time of letting, the land-
lord may be held liable to the injured person. A person
is a "patron" if his visit promises actual or potential
financial benefit to the occupant in connection with the
business conducted on the premises, so that the patron
may be a solicitor of new accounts for a bank as well as a
customer who wants to buy a bottle of beer.285
A landlord is not liable for injuries caused by defects
existing at the time of the lease except as he may have
failed to inform the lessee of defects known to him and
not apparent to the lessee. It is necessary to distinguish
between actual knowledge by the landlord of the dan-
gerous condition, or whether he has information to rea-
sonably support a conclusion of the existence of danger.
Maryland has adopted the rule of liability upon the land-
lord if "he had reason to know" of the danger, as dis-
tinguished from "should have known" of the danger.286 A
lessor who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any
natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to persons upon the land is subject to
liability.287 However, a landlord is not an insurer of the
safety of the premises or the appliances supplied by him. In
Maryland the common law rule that there is no obligation
upon the landlord to repair or rebuild prevails, and in the
absence of agreement the tenant must guard against appar-
ent dangers. 28 Here continues the philosophy that the
liability of a landlord to a tenant rests upon violation of
duty. Unless the particular condition which causes the
injury has been made known to the landlord a reasonable
time before the accident, giving him time to make correc-
tion, there is no liability on the landlord unless the land-
lord has exclusive control of the apparatus whose failure
causes injury. Thus, in the case of an unexplained ex-
plosion of a gas heater the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
did not apply, and the landlord was not liable when it was
shown that he merely retained the right and duty to adjust
and repair, since there was no notice to the landlord nor
opportunity to find and correct the condition causing the
Austin v. Beutner, 211 Md. 61, 124 A. 2d 793 (1956).
State v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A. 2d 100 (1955).
Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d 683 (1955).
2&1 Tbid.
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explosion.2 9 However, it has been held that when a land-
lord makes available a laundry room for the use of all of
his tenants, he is under a duty to keep it and the appliances
therein in a reasonably safe condition.290 In 2310 Madison
Avenue v. Allied Bedding Mfg. Co.,291 the landlord was
held liable for damage to goods of a first floor tenant caused
by water coming from second floor due to a clogged drain
pipe, when there was an agreement by landlord to make
repairs and when he was notified three weeks earlier of a
water leak, and failed to discover the cause of the leak.
The landlord may not escape responsibility for an obliga-
tion to make repairs to appliances or equipment under his
control by delegating the making of such repairs to an in-
dependent contractor.
Liability may result from an obligation assumed by the
landlord's contract. The promise of landlord to repair must
be supported by consideration, such as inducing the tenant
to remain for a longer term; if the landlord's promise is
made after the tenancy begins and the tenant is not induced
to do anything but what he has already contracted to do,
the promise of landlord is without consideration.292 When
a landlord agrees to make repairs and does not do so, then
the tenant or a member of his family has an action for any
personal injuries sustained, provided there is some clear
act of negligence beyond the breach of contract.293 How-
ever, a tenant has no action for personal injuries resulting
from the mere breach of a contract to repair, since to be
actionable such breach must be a negligent one.294 When
a landlord makes repairs, whether or not bound by a cove-
nant to repair, he must exercise reasonable care in making
the repairs or improvements and is liable for any injuries
sustained by the tenant, just as he would be if he were
obligated by a covenant in the lease to do the work.298
When an obligation is on the landlord to repair, he is not
responsible for injuries caused by hidden defects in the
premises unknown to him,296 and a casual expression of
Lee v. Housing Autho. of Baltimore, 203 Md. 453, 101 A. 2d 881 (1954).
2o See note, 25 A.L.R. 2d 565, dealing with a landlord's liability for per-
sonal injury or death due to defects in appliances supplied for use of dif-
ferent tenants.
'209 Md. 399, 121 A. 2d 203 (1956).
McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
Robinson v. Hell, 128 Md. 645, 98 A. 195 (1916) ; Edelman v. Monouy-
das, 186 Md. 479, 47 A. 2d 41 (1946).
" Thompson v. Clemens, 96 Md. 196, 53 A. 919 (1903). Pinkerton v.
Slocumb, 126 Md. 665, 95 A. 965 (1915). Wilson v. Yates, 137 Md. 54, 111
A. 161 (1920).
"I Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d, 683 (1955).
0,King v. Compton, 187 Md. 363, 50 A. 2d 131 (1946).
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opinion as to the safety of premises will not support an
action for negligent misrepresentation.297 The careful prac-
titioner will keep in mind that the foundation of a land-
lord's tort liability lies in negligence, regardless of the
origin of his duty, whether in contract, or imposed upon
him by his status or the ownership of the property.
28
Nuisance. The distinction between nuisance and negli-
gence lies in definition of a private nuisance as "a violation
of an absolute duty so that it does not rest on the degree
of care used but rather on the degree of danger existing
with the best of care".299 When property leased is not a
nuisance at the time but becomes a nuisance only by the
act of the tenant while the latter is in possession, the owner
is not liable to third parties for the consequences of the
nuisance. 0
A distinguishing point seems to be whether the nature
of the tenancy detracted from the owner-landlord's control.
Here the duration of the tenancy seems to be of moment;
a short-term tenancy, such as from month to month, creates
the thought of the privilege of the landlord to regain con-
trol of the premises. Consequently, liability in the landlord
may exist on the ground of reasonable opportunity in him
to abate the nuisance created by the tenant."'
When the premises are a nuisance at the time of the
letting, then the owner is liable whether in or out of
possession. 0 2 Both the landlord and the tenant may be
liable to a third person damaged by the defective condition
of leased premises, notwithstanding the provisions of the
lease, when the premises contain a nuisance at the time
of the demise which becomes active by ordinary use of the
premises by the tenant.30 3 In this connection see Sherwood
Brothers, Inc. v. Eckard,"4 in which it was held that the
landlord is liable for injuries to persons on leased premises,
such as customers of the lessee, only to the same extent
as he is to the tenant himself; accordingly, the landlord is
Holt v. Kolker, 189 Md. 636, 57 A. 2d 287 (1948).
2 For a review of the authorities dealing with the liability of a landlord
for his failure to make repairs, see Richardson v. Katzoff, Ct. of Com.
Pleas, O'Dunne, J.; Daily Record, April 1, 1939.
21 State v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 34, 113 A. 2d 100 (1955).
1 Marshall v. Price, 162 Md. 687, 161 A. 172 (1932). In this connection
see note in 39 A.L.R. 2d 973, dealing with the liability of the owner or
landlord for injuries to a third party resulting from a nuisance created
by a tenant.
139 A.L.R. 2d 973.
Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 108 (1856). Miller v. Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 73 A.
891 (1909). Longley v. McGeoch, 115 Md. 182, 80 A. 843 (1911).
w
0 Beck v. Hanline, 122 Md. 68, 89 A. 377 (1913).
204 Md. 485, 105 A. 2d 207 (1954).
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not liable for injuries caused by defects existing at the
time of the lease except as he may have failed to inform
the lessee of defects known to him and not apparent to the
lessee. When large numbers of patrons may be expected
to visit the leased premises, the landlord is obliged to see
to it that the leased premises are in a reasonably safe con-
dition at the time of letting."5 In Austin v. Buettner, °6 the
Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle that the landlord
may be liable to a patron of his lessee if the property leased
is not in a reasonably safe condition at the time of the lease.
Also, in this case the Court indicated that it was not com-
mitted to the principle that the landlord may be liable to
a patron of his lessee if the property leased is not in a
reasonably safe condition at the time of the lease. Also, in
this case the Court indicated that it was not committed to
the principle that the landlord's liability would be affected
by the number of patrons. The reason for the presence of
the injured person on the premises is of importance. The
nature of liability of both landlord and tenant is affected
by whether the injured person is an invitee, a business
visitor or one with no existing potential business relation-
ship. However, this liability exists only when injury occurs
in a portion of the premises to which patrons are invited. °7
Contributory negligence. A tenant is not guilty of con-
tributory negligence unless the defect is so obviously dan-
gerous that no person of ordinary prudence would be will-
ing to use it.30s That a tenant knows of a defective con-
dition and complains to the landlord does not necessarily
mean that the tenant was aware of the full extent of the
danger, and contributory negligence in such instance is ajury question.3 09 A tenant of a portion of an entire build-
ing is not contributorily negligent if he fails to anticipate
a negligent lack of care on the part of other tenants of the
building, and if at the time of renting the building was
unsafe and unheated, the landlord is liable to a tenant
injured by the bursting of a water pipe when the landlord
took no precautions against such a happening. 10
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 359.
211 Md. 61, 124 A. 2d 793 (1956).
Sherwood Brothers v. Eckard, 8upra, n. 304.
Miller v. Howard, 206 Md. 148, 110 A. 2d 683 (1955).
SMcKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A. 2d 95 (1955).
31 Corn. Realty Co. v. Nat. Dis. Pr. Corp., 196 Md. 274, 76 A. 24 155 (1950).
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XIX. REMEDIES OF LANDLORD
A. At Law.
Most written leases contain covenants on the part of
the tenant relating to the use to be made of the demised
premises. The rights reserved to the landlord in most in-
struments of lease fall into one or more of three categories.
Reentry. The usual provision gives the landlord the
right to reenter upon the termination of the term or for
breach of covenant by the tenant. In practice a landlord
rarely avails himself of such right. It has been held at
nisi prius that when a landlord attempts to exercise a right
of reentry given him by the lease and is foiled by the
tenant's threats, equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the tenant
from resisting the entry. 1' However, in Redwood Hotel,
Inc. v. Korbien,32 the Court of Appeals denied equitable
relief to a landlord because the principal relief sought
was ejectment of the tenant. By analogy, see Glorius v.
Watkins,1 3 in which the Court of Appeals denied equity
jurisdiction in a case brought by a vendor of real estate
against the vendee under an installment sale contract, the
purpose being to clear a cloud on title, the court saying
that to grant the relief would in effect give a chancery
suit the effect of an action of ejectment.
Tenancy determined by breach. Provisions in a lease
for determination of the tenancy for breach of covenant
by the tenant do not render the lease void upon such
breach, but voidable at the option of the landlord. 14 For
breach of a covenant in a lease the landlord has the right
to relief in equity by injunction 315 or at law by an action
in ejectment318 When a lease contains provisions that it
shall be void for a breach of covenant, such as payment of
rent, then upon a breach a court of law must hold the
estate divested.317 However, equity will permit a forfeiture
only when it is the result of culpable neglect on the part
of the tenant but not when the omission is caused by
accident." 8 When rent is mailed in time to reach the
lessor in the ordinary course of mail there is no forfeiture
'Snyder v. Baslow, Cir. Ct. for Prince Georges Co., Gray, J.; Daily
Record, Aug. 24, 1943.
8" 195 Md. 402, 73 A. 2d 468 (1950).
203 Md. 546, 102 A. 2d 274 (1954).
In' Western Bk. of Balt. v. Kyle, 6 Gill 343 (Md. 1848); Baltimore v.
Steam Packet Co., 164 Md. 284, 164 A. 878 (1933).
" Live Stock Co. v. Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A. 2d 130 (1941).
Schlerf v. Bond, 139 Md. 10, 114 A. 739 (1921) ; 2 PoE, n. 1, § 482.
" Cooke v. Brice, 20 Md. 397 (1863).8 Wylie v. Kirby, 115 Md. 282, 80 A. 962 (1911).
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for tardy payment if the letter is miscarried or delayed
in the post office.319 When forfeiture is merely security for
the payment of money, equity will treat it as in the nature
of a penalty and in a proper case will grant relief. 20 How-
ever, when a lease has been declared forfeited by a land-
lord for default in rent payments and tenant is insolvent,
equity will not strike down the forfeiture, even though all
arrears of rent are tendered by officers of the corporate
lessee. This is on the theory that the promise of the tenant
to pay later rent is manifestly worthless, as solvency is
necessary to the performance of future rent obligations.
Only when a substantial compliance with the covenant to
pay future rent to the landlord is assured will equity
deny forfeiture.8 21
Conversion of tenancy. Some leases for years provide
that upon breach by the tenant of a covenant, the letting
is converted into one from month to month. If such a pro-
vision is effective, then, upon giving the notice of termi-
nation, the landlord would be entitled to the summary
remedy against the lessee as a tenant holding over, and, in
such case, the landlord would not be limited to ejectment
against the lessee in a court of record. While obiter dicta,
a nisi prius court did not criticize a provision in a lease
that a violation of a covenant by the tenant would result
in a conversion of the tenancy from one for years to one
from month to month. 22 The question has not been decided
by the Court of Appeals. However, some analogy may be
made to the cases involving the contract provisions in
Installment Land Contracts prior to Chapter 596, of the
Acts of 1951,8' under which the Court of Appeals has given
effect to provisions converting a vendor-purchaser relation-
ship into a landlord-tenant relationship upon breach by
the purchaser.
B. Equity.
If a landower (by agreement, or by his failure to act
to terminate a tenancy) permits a negligent or insolvent
tenant to remain on his land, he cannot invoke the aid of
equity except to prevent waste or irreparable injury.24 An
*"Phillips Roofing Co. v. Md. Broadcasting Co., 184 Md. 187, 40 A. 2d
298 (1944).
m Carpenter v. Wilson, 100 Md. 13, 59 A. 186 (1904).
Evergreen Corp. v. Pacheo, 218 Md. 230, 145 A. 2d 774 (1958).
SCaroletta Apartment Corp. v. Burns; Sup. Ct. of Baltimore City,
Mason, J.; Daily Record, March 3, 1950.
10Now 2 MD. CODE (1957), Art. 21, §§ 110-116.
Blain v. Everitt, 36 Md. 73 (1872).
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injunction will not lie to oust a tenant on the ground that
he is a bad tenant and worries the landlord; that his rent
is in arrears; that he is disagreeable; that he will not give
up possession of the premises upon demand of the land-
lord; or that he is insolvent. Even though it is contendable
that an equity action will avoid a multiplicity of suits, this
apparently is not an independent ground of equitable
jurisdiction.'
Fraud in inception. A landlord induced to enter into a
lease by fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation by
the tenant has a remedy in equity, the relationship having
a fiduciary character. 26
Waste. By injunction, a landlord may prevent his
lessee, or those claiming or holding under the lessee, from
converting the demised premises to uses inconsistent with
the terms of the contract of lease, and from making
material alterations for such purposes, as well as commit-
ting other kinds of waste. If the acts constituting waste
are those of a sub-lessee, the original lessee is not a neces-
sary party. 27 However, the prevention of waste is not an
adequate basis for a suit in equity, in the absence of cir-
cumstances specifically alleged and proved, to show irre-
parable damage.2 8
XX. DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO TENANT
While a tenant will not be permitted to dispute his
landlord's title, particularly when he has entered by virtue
of his tenancy,329 he may show that his landlord's title has
expired, been transferred or defeated,30 or that landlord
himself admits a condition of the title which precludes the
relationship of landlord and tenant. 13  Deficiencies in
premises ascertainable by the tenant before he enters into
a lease will not serve as defenses to a suit for rent.332 A
lessor cannot claim rent falling due after eviction of the
tenant by title paramount, as the enjoyment of the land
is the consideration for the rent.833
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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
A. Waiver and Estoppel.
To waive forfeiture, an act of the landlord must amount
to an affirmance of the tenancy or a recognition of its con-
tinuance, such as distraining for rent accruing after the
right of forfeiture arises. 34 The receipt of rent after a
breach of covenant does not of itself operate as a waiver,
unless the rent accrued subsequently to the act which
works the forfeiture. 35 Acceptance of rent accruing after
a breach is a waiver of the forfeiture.
36
As forfeitures for breach of covenant are not favored,
any slight acquiescence in a breach will be construed as a
waiver. 37 When a landlord fails to exact prompt payment
of rent he may be estopped from claiming a forfeiture for
tardy payment of a later installment.3
The weight of authority seems to be that a mere demand
by the landlord for rent after the term is not a binding
election.3 9 Normally, when rent is paid by the occupier
to the owner of land, the inference is that they intended
to create a tenancy; but when a landlord has judgment of
restitution, acceptance of rent by him during the period an
appeal is pending does not estop him from enforcing his
judgment when the judgment is affirmed on the appeal. 40
Renewal. Even though the lease provides for written
notice by tenant for its renewal, this may be waived by
the landlord; and if he waives in fact, this will be binding
upon the landlord's successor in title who has no actual
knowledge thereof. 4'
Assignment. When a lease contains a covenant against
assignment, and the landlord permits an assignee to remain
in possession for a number of years, permitting him to
make improvements, the landlord has waived his rights
and is estopped from asserting them. 42 Similarly, if lessor
in a lease containing such a covenant by the lessee against
assignment, consents to an assignment without restriction
as to future assignments, the condition is waived by the
landlord, and lessee may thereafter assign the term with-
out lessor's consent.3 43
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